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I. Introduction
“The seat may be warm now, Mr. Master, but the chair in which you sit
is truly the hot seat. . . . The stakes in this case are very, very high.”1 Special
Master and former Wyoming Congressman Teno Roncalio was the recipient
of this message. It came from Wyoming Attorney General John Troughton on
January 26, 1981. The setting was Judge Ewing Kerr’s courtroom in Cheyenne,
Wyoming. It was the first day of a sixteen-month trial over a matter that, more
than any other, would distinguish a general stream adjudication that had been
initiated by the State of Wyoming four years prior and ultimately would span
the next four decades—an adjudication of water rights in the Wind-Big Horn
Basin (colloquially, the “Big Horn adjudication”). The issue at hand concerned
the existence, nature, and scope of a water right held by the Eastern Shoshone
and Northern Arapaho tribes on Wyoming’s sole Indian reservation, the Wind
River Reservation, under the Second Treaty of Fort Bridger (1868). Counsel
for the United States, Regina Slater, could not have agreed more fully with the
attorney general’s assessment of the height of the stakes and the temperature of
the special master’s seat. “Your Honor, this morning begins what the United States
regards as probably one of the most important cases that has ever occurred in the
history of the United States in relation to the Shoshone and Arapahoe Tribes and
the Wind River Indian Reservation,” Ms. Slater explained. “This case . . . will
resolve, hopefully, the rights of the Tribes to the water that is necessary for them to
continue as a viable community of people in the area which has been their home
since well before the history books record the Treaty of 1868.”2 Attorney General
Troughton did not dispute this remark or dismiss it offhand. He acknowledged
that the tribes had been “given hope by the federal government in 1868 . . . that
under the Winters Doctrine sufficient water for the purposes of the reservation
1
Trial Transcript 50 (January 26, 1981), available at http://bhrac.washakiecounty.net/DocumentCenter/BHCR/O5W4SS0000.pdf [hereinafter Trial Transcript].
2

Id. at 37.

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2543661
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were employed by the creation of the reservation.”3 The rub in his view was that
“non-Indians were given similar hope.”4 The same federal officials who had “held
out hope under the Winters Doctrine to the Indian tribes,” according to the
attorney general, also had “held out hope to the non-Indian irrigators under the
Carey Acts, the Homestead Acts, and the Reclamation Acts.”5
This initial dialogue before Special Master Roncalio captured the essence of
this defining phase of the Big Horn adjudication, setting the stage not just for
the sixteen-month trial over which the special master would preside, but also
a subsequent appeal that would arrive at the U.S. Supreme Court eight years
later.6 “For the first time in their history, the Shoshone and Arapahoe Tribes are
poised to build a sustained and productive reservation agricultural economy”
asserted tribal advocate Susan Williams at oral argument before the Court.7
“This is what their ancestors envisioned in 1868 and what the tribes must do
in 1989 to alleviate staggering unemployment and poverty-related social ills on
this reservation.”8 Although the tribes should not be restricted from using water
afforded by their water right for purposes other than agriculture in Ms. Williams’s
view,9 unemployment among tribal members was seventy percent at the time, so
“expanded agriculture and related business, even if only as subsistence [could]
make a real difference.”10 On the other hand, what impacts would the tribes’
water use have on the lives and livelihoods of non-Indian parties? Counsel for
the State of Wyoming, Michael White, painted a grim picture. It could result in
a “gallon-for-gallon” reduction for state water rights holders he argued, pointing
to an observation made by the state district court that “holders of state awarded
water rights will find their formerly valuable water rights worthless.”11 These were

3

Id. at 56.

4

Id.

5

Id.

A copy of the Supreme Court oral argument transcript—and a recording of the oral
argument—can be accessed at Oyez, IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, Wyoming v. United
States, http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1988/1988_88_309 (last visited March 17, 2015)
[hereinafter Supreme Court Transcript].
6

7

Id. at 20.

8

Id.

Responding to a query regarding whether the tribes’ water right “should incorporate or
be used to maintain instream flows,” Ms. Williams replied that the water right had been set aside
in 1868 “primarily for agricultural purposes,” but that in modern times the tribes “should not be
subject to any restrictions as to transfer of uses because no other water rights holder in the country
is so similarly restricted.” Id. at 20. It was former Chief Justice Rehnquist with whom Ms. Williams
shared this exchange. Susan Williams, Results Following Litigation: The Wind River Tribes/Big Horn
River, in The Future of Indian and Federal Reserved Water Rights: The Winters Centennial
171 (Barbara Cosens and Judith V. Royster eds. 2012).
9

10

Supreme Court Transcript, supra note 6, at 19.

11

Id. at 20–21.
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weighty concerns leveraged by counsel on both sides. Adding further to their
gravity were multiple questions and remarks from the Justices suggesting their
disposition of the case very well could alter the Court’s existing legal doctrine
governing tribal water rights nationally.12
There are proverbial miles to go to fulfill the essential purpose of this article—
which is to illuminate the Big Horn adjudication’s thirty-seven-year history—but
these vignettes provide probative initial illustrations of the proceeding’s relevance,
historically and prospectively, within the State of Wyoming, the American West
as a region, and the corpus of U.S. jurisprudence that addresses intersovereign
relations over water resources. It would be an impossible task to recount the
adjudication’s history in a comprehensive manner in the pages that follow.
Their content is drawn mainly from primary sources contained in a digital
archive created for the Big Horn adjudication by the State of Wyoming.13 These
materials are abundant—and earnestly commended to any serious student of
the adjudication—yet even so do not themselves shed light on the full scope of
economic, environmental, political, and social factors that collectively have made
up the context in which the adjudication has been situated.14 In this regard, the
narrative that follows espouses the view that law (water law and otherwise) is
“organic”—that it is “part of a time and a place, the product of a specific time and
actual place”15—and it is my sincere hope that the discussion below offers a useful
jumping-off point for those who wish to learn more about the inner workings of the
Big Horn adjudication and its surrounding context. This account of these matters
begins in Part II with an overview of the geography, hydrology, and complex land
ownership pattern of the Wind-Big Horn Basin. Part III then transitions from the
physical to the legal landscape, canvassing seminal U.S. water law doctrines that
had come into existence prior to the adjudication’s commencement and served
as its backdrop. Part IV, in turn, chronicles the adjudication’s history. It surveys
the thirty-seven-year period spanning from the State of Wyoming’s initiation of
the adjudication in January 1977 to Judge Robert Skar’s issuance of an order
concluding the adjudication in September 2014.16 Part V draws the article to a
12
For a more detailed discussion of the case, Wyoming v. United States, see infra notes 272–94
and accompanying text
13
Washakie County, Big Horn Adjudication, Chronological Court Record, http://bhrac.
washakiecounty.net/Searches.aspx?SearchIndex=BHCR (last visited March 17, 2015).
14
For an excellent contextual perspective on the Big Horn adjudication, see Geoffrey
O’Gara, What You See in Clear Water: Indians, Whites, and a Battle over Water in the
American West (2000).
15
Charles F. Wilkinson, Fire on the Plateau: Conflict and Endurance in the American
West 81 (1999).
16
Since Judge Skar’s issuance of the final order concluding the Big Horn adjudication, two
appeals have been filed in the Wyoming Supreme Court challenging very narrow decisions made
regarding two state law-based water rights (permits) at issue in Phase III of the adjudication. These
appeals have been filed by Ms. Betty Whitt and Mr. Frank E. Mohr, respectively, and they are
currently pending as of the time of this writing. For updates on the Whitt appeal, see Wyoming
Judicial Branch, Clerk’s Office Supreme Court, Wyoming Appellate E-Filing, https://efiling.
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close with reflections on the adjudication’s overarching significance and the path
that lies ahead.

II. Wind-Big Horn Basin
A. Of Mountains, Plains and Rivers
Encompassing an area of nearly 22,900 square miles in Wyoming’s
northwestern corner—equivalent to twenty-three percent of the state’s overall
land base—the Wind-Big Horn Basin comprises a landscape defined by a
breathtaking combination of broad, rolling plains and high mountains.17 It is a
basin rimmed by alpine stretches of the Rocky Mountains that inspired Albert
Bierstadt’s nineteenth-century paintings of the American West such as Lander’s
Peak.18 Included among these majestic mountains are the Wind River Range
in the southwest, the Big Horn Range in the northeast, the Absaroka (formerly
Yellowstone) Range in the east, and the lower-lying Owl Creek and Bridger ranges
dividing the Wind and Big Horn basins in the south.19 While the basin is home
to Wyoming’s highest peak—Gannett Peak (13,804 feet)—its elevation drops to
nearly 3,500 feet where the Big Horn River crosses into Montana.20 Falling within
the bookends of this roughly 10,000 feet of topographical relief is a plethora of
alpine tundra, high-mountain forests, sagebrush-covered rolling hills, flat, treelined river valleys, and irrigated meadows.21
Although referred to throughout this article as the “Wind-Big Horn Basin,”
the hydrology of this area is slightly more nuanced and involves a total of five subbasins: the Wind River Basin, Big Horn Basin, Clarks Fork Basin, Yellowstone

courts.state.wy.us/public/caseView.do?csIID=16935 (last visited May 5, 2015). For updates on the
Mohr appeal, see Wyoming Judicial Branch, Clerk’s Office Supreme Court, Wyoming Appellate
E-Filing, https://efiling.courts.state.wy.us/public/caseView.do?csIID=17057 (last visited May 5,
2015). Because of the discrete focus of these appeals on two specific permits—amidst the literally
thousands of water rights addressed in the proceeding—this article treats Judge Skar’s final order as
effectively closing the Big Horn adjudication.
Wyoming Water Development Commission, Wind-Bighorn Basin Plan Update 10, 13
(2010), available at http://waterplan.state.wy.us/plan/bighorn/2010/finalrept/finalrept.pdf [here
inafter Plan Update].
17

The Metropolitan Museum of Art, HellBrunn Timeline of Art History, The Rocky
Mountains, Lander’s Peak (1863), http://www.metmuseum.org/toah/works-of-art/07.123 (last
visited March 17, 2015).
18

For a useful map of these and other physiographic features of the basin, see Wyoming State
Geological Survey, Wind/Bighorn River Basin Water Plan Update, Groundwater Study
Level 1 (2008-2011): Available Groundwater Determination Technical Memorandum 3-20
fig. 3-2 (2012), available at http://waterplan.state.wy.us/plan/bighorn/2010/finalrept/gw-finalrept.
pdf [hereinafter Groundwater Study].
19

20

Id. at 3-21.

21

Id. at 3-21; Plan Update, supra note 17, at 13–14.
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Basin, and Madison/Gallatin Basin.22 These five sub-basins collectively make up
the State of Wyoming’s “Water Division III.”23 By way of overview, the Wind
River Basin (approximately 7,900 square miles) occupies the southern portion of
this drainage area, the Big Horn Basin (approximately 12,500 square miles) spans
across the northern portion, and the Clarks Fork, Yellowstone, and Madison/
Gallatin basins (approximately 2,500 square miles collectively) comprise the
northwest corner.24 Most notable among the basin’s watercourses are the Wind
River and Big Horn River, which as a matter of hydrology, though not in name,
are the same river. With its headwaters in the high mountains of the Wind River
Basin’s western rim, the Wind River leaves the basin flowing northward through
the Wind River Canyon in the Owl Creek Range, and becomes the Big Horn
River at a point called “Wedding of the Waters” just south of Thermopolis,
Wyoming.25 From Wedding of the Waters, the Big Horn River meanders north
through the Big Horn Basin to the Montana state line, taking in flows from
many tributaries.26 Most of the water flowing in the Wind-Big Horn system
originates as winter snowfall and spring and summer thunderstorms, and there is
wide variation in average annual precipitation across the basin.27 These averages
range from six to ten inches in interior areas to up to seventy inches on peaks of
10,000 feet elevation or higher.28 In addition to serving as the source of surface
flows, this precipitation finds its way into more than 150 groundwater aquifers
and confining units within the basin.29 Ultimately, as a major contributor to the
Missouri River drainage system, the basin’s flows meander hundreds of miles from
their Rocky Mountain area of origin to their terminus in the Gulf of Mexico.30

22

For a map of these five sub-basins, see Plan Update, supra note 17, at 11 fig. 4.

For a map of the State of Wyoming’s four water divisions, see State Engineer’s Office, Board
of Control, http://seo.wyo.gov/agency-divisions/board-of-control (last visited March 17, 2015).
23

Groundwater Study, supra note 19, at 3-18, 3-21, 3-24. The collective surface area of the
Clarks Fork, Yellowstone, and Madison/Gallatin basins (2,500 square miles) has been calculated by
subtracting the combined surface area of the Wind River and Big Horn basins (20,400 square miles)
from the overall surface area of the drainage basin (22,883 square miles).
24

25

Id. at 3-21; Plan Update, supra note 17, at 11 fig. 4.

Plan Update, supra note 17, at 11 fig. 4. For lists of tributaries of the Wind and Big Horn
rivers, see Groundwater Study, supra note 19, at 3-23 tbl. 3-1 (Wind River), 3-24 tbl. 3-2 (Big
Horn River).
26

27

Groundwater Study, supra note 19, at 3-21.

28

Id. For a useful map of basin precipitation, see Plan Update, supra note 17, at 16 fig. 6.

29
See generally Groundwater Study, supra note 19, at 7-101 to 7-178 (providing detailed
discussion of physical and chemical characteristics of basin’s aquifers and confining units). As with
average annual precipitation, there is wide variation in estimated annual aquifer recharge, with
recharge rates ranging from as low as .25 inches per year in the basin’s interior to up to 50 inches
per year in the high mountains. Id. at 5-38 fig. 5-2. See also id. at 6-90 fig. 6-7 (displaying recharge
rates as a percentage of precipitation).
30

Id. at 3-21.
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B. Of Lines, Maps and Ownership
Superimposed on the landscape and waterscape of the Wind-Big Horn Basin,
as painted in sweeping strokes above, is a complex land ownership pattern with
interwoven federal, tribal, private, and state components.31 More than 200 years
of U.S. history make up the seams of this patchwork pattern and the associated
“drawing of lines on a map [and] definition and allocation of ownership”
through which it has come into being.32 It is a pattern that, as will become
evident below, held much significance within the Big Horn adjudication, serving
largely to explain the diverse, numerous, and competing types of water rights
requiring reconciliation.
Federal lands pervade the Wind-Big Horn Basin, constituting sixty-four
percent of the basin’s land base—without accounting for the Wind River Indian
Reservation—and thereby making the federal government the basin’s “majority”
landowner.33 Traced to their historical root, these federal lands derive from what
has been called an “imperial fire sale” held on April 30, 1803, involving President
Thomas Jefferson as the buyer and French Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte as the
seller: the Louisiana Purchase.34 Although the precise boundaries of the territory
that the United States purchased for $15 million were unclear at the time,
subsequent instruments in the form of the Convention of 1818 between the
United States and Great Britain, and the Adams-Onis Treaty in 1819 between the
United States and Spain, would clarify the northern, western, and southwestern
boundaries of the Louisiana Territory.35 Situated on the eastern slope of the
Continental Divide,36 the Wind-Big Horn Basin was positioned directly along

For a useful map of the land ownership pattern in the basin, see Wyoming Water
Development Office, Wyoming State Water Plan, Wind/Bighorn River Basin Plan Executive
Summary, http://waterplan.state.wy.us/plan/bighorn/2003/execsumm.html (last visited March
17, 2015).
31

32
Patricia Nelson Limerick, The Legacy
American West 27 (1987).

of

Conquest: The Unbroken Past

of the

33
Plan Update, supra note 17, at 12, 13 fig. 5. For a useful map of federal lands within the
basin, see id. at 71 fig. 30.
34
Richard White, It’s Your Misfortune and None of My Own: A New History of the
American West 62 (1991). An excellent map identifying the chronology of the Louisiana Purchase
and other treaties and agreements forged by the United States and England, France, Mexico, and
Spain in the nineteenth century—i.e., in the course of U.S. territorial expansion—can be found
in U.S. Department of the Interior, U.S Geological Survey, The National Atlas of the
United States of America, Territorial Acquisitions (2005), http://nationalmap.gov/small_scale/
printable/images/pdf/territory/pagetacq3.pdf (last visited March 17, 2015).
35
Clyde A. Milner II, Introduction and Chronology, in The Oxford History of the American
West 158 (Clyde A. Milner et al. eds. 1996); White, supra note 34, at 62.
36

Plan Update, supra note 17, at 10.
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the territory’s western border, thus fitting squarely within the terms of a deal that
for less than four cents per acre added over 800,000 square miles to the United
States and doubled its size.37
The contemporary concentration of federal lands in the Wind-Big Horn
Basin reflects the historical fact that the United States has reserved for various
purposes most of the lands over which it assumed ownership two centuries ago.
Established on March 1, 1872, as a “public park or pleasuring-ground for the
benefit and enjoyment of the people,”38 the first federally administered national
park in U.S. history, Yellowstone National Park, extends across eleven percent of
the basin (2,512 square miles) in its northwest corner.39 Abutting Yellowstone’s
eastern and southern borders are Shoshone National Forest and Bridger-Teton
National Forest. The former was designated on March 30, 1891, as part of
the first national forest in U.S. history—the “Yellowstone Park Timber Land
Reserve”40—and the latter was established as two separate reserves, the Teton and
Bridger National Forests, in 1897 and 1911, respectively.41 Big Horn National
Forest was similarly created in 1897 and arches across the basin’s northeastern
rim.42 A total area of 4,759 square miles (twenty-one percent of the basin) falls
within these national forests.43 Complementing these two classes of federal lands
are 6,952 square miles of lands administered by the Bureau of Land Management,
which make up thirty percent of the basin.44 Also noteworthy in this vein are

Derek Hayes, Historical Atlas of the American West 65 (2009); Walter Nugent,
Comparing Wests, in The Oxford History of the American West 812 (Clyde A. Milner et al.
eds., 1996).
37

38
An Act to set apart a certain Tract of Land lying near the Head-waters of the Yellowstone
River as a public Park, 17 Stat. 32 (1872). In accord with the quoted text, section 2 of this Act
charged the Secretary of the Interior with adopting regulations to “provide for the preservation,
from injury or spoliation, of all timber, mineral deposits, natural curiosities, or wonders within said
park, and their retention in their natural condition.” Id.

Plan Update, supra note 17, at 12 tbl. 2; White, supra note 34, at 410. The National Park
Service also administers Big Horn Canyon National Recreation Area, which is located adjacent
to Yellowtail Dam on the Big Horn River and encompasses more than 120,000 acres. National
Park Service, Big Horn Canyon National Recreation Area, Management, http://www.nps.gov/bica/
parkmgmt/index.htm (last visited March 17, 2015).
39

The establishment dates and subsequent history of these national forests (and others) are
accounted for exhaustively in appendix one of Richard C. Davis, Encyclopedia of American
Forest and Conservation History (1983). The Forest History Society has posted an electronic
copy of this appendix at http://www.foresthistory.org/ASPNET/places/National%20Forests%20
of%20the%20U.S.pdf (last visited March 17, 2015).
40

41
Id. at 8, 49. These two forests were administratively combined into the Bridger-Teton
National Forest in 1973. Id. at 8, 49.
42

Id. at 7.

43

Plan Update, supra note 17, at 12 tbl. 2, 13 fig. 5.

44

Id.
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332 square miles of lands (equivalent to two percent of the basin)45 encompassed
within Bureau of Reclamation projects like the Boysen Unit, Riverton Unit, and
Shoshone Project.46
Omitted from the discussion of federal lands thus far is again the State of
Wyoming’s sole Indian reservation: the Wind River Reservation. It encompasses
2,417 square miles of the Wind River Basin (equivalent to eleven percent of the
overall basin’s land base) and is jointly occupied by the Eastern Shoshone and
Northern Arapaho tribes.47 As expressed by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1938,48 the
reservation falls in “the choicest and best-watered portion of Wyoming,” within a
basin known as the “Warm Valley” that had been a favorite hunting and trapping
area of American Indian tribes, including the Shoshone, long before formation
of the treaty creating the reservation.49 That treaty was the Second Treaty of Fort
Bridger, which was formed by the United States, Eastern Shoshone Tribe, and
Bannock Tribe on July 3, 1868, and ratified by Congress roughly eight months
later.50 It followed on the heels of a predecessor instrument, the First Treaty
of Fort Bridger, that had been formed in 1863 and delineated as “Shoshonee
country” a 44,672,000-acre tract spanning across portions of Colorado, Idaho,
Utah, and Wyoming.51 By the Second Treaty of Fort Bridger, the Shoshone Tribe
45

Id.

U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, Boysen Division, http://www.
usbr.gov/projects/Project.jsp?proj_Name=Boysen%20Division (last visited March 17, 2015); U.S.
Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, Riverton Unit, http://www.usbr.gov/projects/
Project.jsp?proj_Name=Riverton%20Unit (last visited March 17, 2015); U.S. Department of
the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, Shoshone Project, http://www.usbr.gov/projects/Project.
jsp?proj_Name=Shoshone%20Project (last visited March 17, 2015).
46

Plan Update, supra note 17, at 12 tbl. 2, 13 fig. 5. Both tribes maintain websites that
provide information about their histories and governmental institutions and programs. Eastern
Shoshone Tribe, http://easternshoshonetribe.org/ (last visited March 17, 2015); Northern Arapaho
Tribe, http://www.northernarapaho.com/ (last visited March 17, 2015). For useful historical
sources, see Henry Edwin Stamm, People of the Wind River: the Eastern Shoshones, 18251900 (1999); Loretta Fowler, The Arapaho (1989); Virginia Cole Trenholm, The Arapahoes,
Our People (1970); Virginia Cole Trenholm & Maurine Carley, The Shoshonis, Sentinels of
the Rockies (1964).
47

48

United States v. Shoshone Tribe of Indians, 304 U.S. 111, 114 (1938) (Shoshone II).

The Wind River Reservation, 1865–1910: Historical Photographs and Anecdotes 1
(1984). For an insightful description of the Eastern Shoshone’s selection of the Warm Valley for the
reservation, see O’Gara, supra note 14, at 184 (quoting testimony of Shoshone Elder Starr Weed
during Phase I of Big Horn adjudication).
49

Treaty with the Eastern Band Shoshoni and Bannock, 15 Stat. 673 (1868) [hereinafter
Second Treaty]. The Bannock Tribe resides with the Northern Shoshone Tribe—as part of the
federally recognized Shoshone-Bannock Tribes—on the Fort Hall Reservation in southeastern
Idaho, which was also established by the Second Treaty of Fort Bridger in 1868. Shoshone-Bannock
Tribes, History of the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, http://www.shoshonebannocktribes.com/
shoshone-bannock-history.html (last visited March 17, 2015).
50

Treaty with the Eastern Shoshoni, 18 Stat. 685 (1863) [hereinafter First Treaty]. A useful
map of the original 44,672,000-acre tract can be found in The Wind River Reservation, supra note
49, at 7.
51
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“relinquished to the United States [this] reservation of 44,672,000 acres,” as it has
been described by the Supreme Court, “and accepted in exchange a reservation of
3,054,182 acres in Wyoming.”52 The Second Treaty of Fort Bridger specified the
boundaries of this reservation, restricted access to and settlement within it, and
contained a promise that the tribe would make the reservation their “permanent
home” and “make no permanent settlement elsewhere.”53 The U.S. military
subsequently moved the Northern Arapaho Tribe onto the reservation ten years
after the treaty had been formed.54 At the time of this writing, slightly more than
4,000 Eastern Shoshone tribal members and 9,800 Northern Arapaho tribal
members reside on the reservation.55
To be clear, the existing boundaries of the Wind River Indian Reservation
are not those originally established by the Second Treaty of Fort Bridger, but
rather constitute a “diminished reservation” whose diminution is attributable to a
series of land purchase agreements that took place after the reservation had been
created in 1868.56 The first such agreement was the Brunot Agreement (or Lander
Purchase) in 1872.57 It changed the reservation’s southern boundary by ceding
back to the United States 700,642 acres of land located south of the Popo Agie
River for monetary compensation.58 Next to follow in this series was the First
McLaughlin Agreement (or Thermopolis Purchase) in 1897.59 Again in exchange
for cash payment, this agreement ceded to the United States 55,040 acres of land
in and around Thermopolis, Wyoming, including the Big Horn Hot Springs.60
Last in this line, and most significant in terms of the cession size, was the Second

Shoshone Tribe of Indians v. United States, 299 U.S. 476, 485 (1937) (Shoshone I).
Although the First Treaty of Fort Bridger expressly defined and described the boundaries of
“Shoshonee country” in Article 4, nowhere in the treaty do the terms “reserve,” “reservation,” or the
like appear in relation to the 44,672,000-acre tract. First Treaty, supra note 51, Art. 4. Nonetheless,
in two different opinions in the 1930s, Justices Cardozo and Butler plainly do refer to the tract
defined by the First Treaty as a “reservation” that had been “set apart for the Shoshone Tribe” and
later “relinquished” or “ceded” to the United States in the Second Treaty. Shoshone I, 299 U.S. at
485; Shoshone II, 304 U.S. at 113–14.
52

53

Second Treaty, supra note 50, at Arts. 2, 4.

54

Shoshone I, 299 U.S. at 487– 88. See also The Wind River Reservation, supra note 49,

at 14.
55
Eastern Shoshone Tribe, History, http://easternshoshonetribe.org/about-us/ (last visited
March 17, 2015); Northern Arapaho Tribe, Location, http://www.northernarapaho.com/location
(last visited March 17, 2015).
56
In re the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System
and All Other Sources, 753 P.2d 76, 84 (Wyo. 1988) (Big Horn I ).
57
An act to confirm an agreement made with the Shoshone Indians (eastern band) for the
purchase of the south part of their reservation in Wyoming Territory, 18 Stat. 291 (1874).
58

Id. at Arts. I–II. See also Shoshone I, 299 U.S. at 487; Big Horn I, 753 P.2d at 83.

Agreement with the Shoshone and Arapahoe Tribes of Indians in Wyoming, 30 Stat.
93 (1897).
59

60

Id. at Arts. I–III. See also Shoshone I, 299 U.S. at 489; Big Horn I, 753 P.2d at 84.
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McLaughlin Agreement formed in 1905.61 It entailed a transfer of 1,480,000
acres that the United States agreed to broker for sale under the homestead,
townsite, coal, and mineral land laws.62 The United States would either reimburse
the tribes with the funds raised by these sales or, alternatively, expend these funds
on the tribes’ behalf for particular purposes, including securing water rights under
state law and constructing and extending an irrigation system on the diminished
reservation.63 Cessions took place under this agreement until 1934, and in 1940
the Secretary of the Interior began restoring unceded lands to tribal ownership.64
The Secretary also later reacquired ceded (and other) lands in the diminished
reservation that previously had passed into private ownership. The size of the
reservation has remained fairly stable since 1953,65 and currently encompasses
about 2,268,000 acres according to the Bureau of Indian Affairs.66 Of this total
acreage, 1,820,766 acres consist of trust land, including 1,719,566 acres of tribal
land and 101,200 acres of allotted land.67
As is apparent from the discussion above, private landholdings of various
types also are interspersed throughout the Wind-Big Horn Basin, making for the
patchwork pattern of land ownership already mentioned. In total, 4,857 square
miles of private lands exist within the basin, which equates to twenty-one percent
of the land base.68 The vast majority of these lands fall within the Wind River
Basin and Big Horn Basin as opposed to the three smaller northwestern subbasins noted earlier: Clarks Fork, Yellowstone, and Madison/Gallatin.69 Although
de minimis private lands can be found within the national forests identified
above—Big Horn, Bridger-Teton, and Shoshone—a fair amount of these lands
do exist within the Wind River Indian Reservation and across large swaths of
An act to ratify and amend an agreement with the Indians residing on the Shoshone or
Wind River Indian Reservation in the State of Wyoming and to make appropriations for carrying
the same into effect, 33 Stat. 1016 (1905) [hereinafter Second McLaughlin Agreement].
61

62

Id. at Arts. I–II. See also Shoshone I, 299 U.S. at 489; Big Horn I, 753 P.2d at 84.

Second McLaughlin Agreement, supra note 61, at Arts. III–IV. The provision of this
agreement calling for expenditures to secure state water rights, Article III, predated by approximately
four years the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
As discussed fully in Part III, Winters held that treaties like the Second Treaty of Fort Bridger could
implicitly reserve water rights for tribes under federal law.
63

64

Big Horn I, 753 P.2d at 84.

65

Id.

U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Wind River Agency, http://
www.bia.gov/WhoWeAre/RegionalOffices/RockyMountain/WeAre/WindRiver/ (last visited March
17, 2015).
66

67
Email from Ramon Nation, Deputy Superintendent, Wind River Agency, Bureau of Indian
Affairs (January 5, 2015) (on file with author).
68

Plan Update, supra note 17, at 12 tbl. 2, 13 fig. 5.

This pattern can be gleaned by cross-referencing the hydrological and land ownership maps
in (1) Plan Update, supra note 17, at 11 fig. 4, and (2) Wyoming Water Development Office, supra
note 31.
69
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public lands administered by the Bureau of Land Management.70 The genesis of
some of these lands can be traced to Congress’s sale of them to non-Indians under
the disposal era laws just mentioned (e.g., 1862 Homestead Act), while other
tracts originated due to Congress’s allotment of commonly held reservation land
to individual tribal members.71
With seventy-five percent and twenty-one percent of the Wind-Big Horn
Basin in federal and private ownership, respectively, only a sliver of the basin’s
lands (four percent or 961 square miles) are owned by the State of Wyoming.72
These lands consist of parks in various parts of the basin, including Boysen State
Park near Wind River Canyon, Buffalo Bill State Park outside Cody, Hot Springs
State Park in Thermopolis, and Sinks Canyon State Park just south of Lander.73
To the extent that the small proportion of state-owned lands within the basin may
surprise some readers, it can be explained by again going back to the Louisiana
Purchase in 1803 and tracing the territorial and statehood acts that succeeded
it. As highlighted earlier, the Wind-Big Horn Basin fell along the western edge
of the 800,000 square-mile expanse covered by the Louisiana Purchase, as this
expanse was later clarified by the Convention of 1818 and the Adams-Onis
Treaty.74 Following the federal government’s assumption of ownership over
this area, the lands encompassed within the basin became part of five different
organized territories between 1803 and 1868, the latter bookend representing
the year in which the Territory of Wyoming was established.75 The sole provision
of the Wyoming Territorial Act focusing on public land ownership concerned
set asides for school lands from the township grid.76 Thirty-two years later, the

70

Wyoming Water Development Office, supra note 31.

See Second Treaty, supra note 50, at Art. 6 (providing for individual ownership of agricultural tracts by tribal members and their families and for culling out of such tracts from reservation
land previously held in common); Second McLaughlin Agreement, supra note 61, at Art I
(providing for allotment to individual tribal members of tracts within ceded portion of reservation
or, alternatively, selection of new allotted tracts within diminished reservation by individual tribal
members). For a fuller discussion of allotment, see infra notes 120–30 and accompanying text.
71

72

Plan Update, supra note 17, at 12 tbl. 2, 13 fig. 5.

73

Id. at 11 fig. 4.

74

See supra notes 33–37 and accompanying text.

These five organized territories included the Louisiana Territory (1805-1812), Missouri
Territory (1812-1821), Nebraska Territory (1854-1861), Dakota Territory (1861-1863), Idaho
Territory (1863-1864), and again Dakota Territory (1864-1868). The congressional acts establishing
these territories can be found at 8 Stat. 331 (1805), 8 Stat. 743 (1812), 10 Stat. 277 (1854), 12 Stat.
239 (1861), and 12 Stat. 808 (1863). A map identifying how the Wyoming Territory was carved out
from portions of the Dakota, Idaho, Nebraska, and Utah territories between 1861 and 1868 can be
found in Craig Cooper, A History of Water Law, Water Rights & Water Development in Wyoming 20
(2002), available at http://wwdc.state.wy.us/history/Wyoming_Water_Law_History.pdf.
75

76
An act to provide a temporary Government for the Territory of Wyoming, 15 Stat. 178,
183 (1868).
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Wyoming Statehood Act addressed public lands located within the state in a
broader manner, granting specific types and quantities of these lands to the State
of Wyoming upon its admission to the Union.77 Transfers of public lands outside
the narrow confines of these grants were not contemplated by the Act, however, as
stated explicitly in Section 2: “[T]he State of Wyoming shall not be entitled to any
further or other grants of land for any purpose than as expressly provided in this
act . . . .”78 In this manner, the federal government generally retained ownership of
basin lands that it had acquired in 1803 through the Louisiana Purchase, leaving
the State of Wyoming with a marginal interest.

III. Legal Landscape
Just as the physical features of the Wind-Big Horn Basin—mountains, plains,
rivers, and aquifers—defined the landscape and waterscape that would be subject
to the Big Horn adjudication, so too would a body of jurisprudence that had
evolved for over a century prior to the adjudication’s commencement define
the legal rules governing the basin’s water resources. These rules set pillar-like
parameters that would control how these precious flows would be allocated as
well as by whom such decisions would be made. Extensive and often contentious
line drawing had attended the historical formation of this corpus—line drawing
that at bottom controlled access to the natural resource on which human
habitation of, and virtually all forms of commerce within, the American
West depended. The discussion below surveys the evolution of the legal rules
comprising the adjudication’s backdrop in two strands: (1) those defining the
diverse types of water rights that would inform the adjudication’s allocation-related
decisions (“allocational jurisprudence”), and (2) those addressing the forum in
which the existence, nature, and scope of these water rights would be decreed
(“jurisdictional jurisprudence”).

An act to provide for the admission of the State of Wyoming into the Union, and for
other purposes, 26 Stat. 222 (1890). Provisions of this Act addressing public lands and land grants
included Section 2 (disclaiming any effect of the Act on Yellowstone National Park), Section 4
(providing for set asides for school lands), Section 6 (granting fifty sections of public lands for public
buildings at state capital), Section 7 (entitling state to portion of proceeds from public land sales),
Section 8 (vesting previously conferred university lands in state), Section 10 (granting 90,000 acres
of land for agricultural college), and Section 11 (granting additional 500,000 acres of lands to state
for specified purposes). Id. at 222–24.
77

78

Id. at 224.
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A. Allocational Jurisprudence
1. Prior Appropriation Doctrine
The California Gold Rush of 1849 marks the entry point for this overview
of existent water rights at the Big Horn adjudication’s onset.79 Out of this
monumental event in U.S. history emerged the dominant legal doctrine utilized
to allocate water resources in the western United States—more specifically, in
the seventeen contiguous states located west of the Hundredth Meridian.80 This
doctrine is termed “prior appropriation.”81 It is a doctrine whose genesis in U.S.
law postdated legal rules that had been utilized for water allocation by Spanish and
later Mexican communities in the U.S. Southwest for more than two centuries
prior to the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo’s formation in 1848 at the close of
the Mexican-American War.82 It is also a doctrine that over the latter half of the
nineteenth century throughout the western states and territories generally (though
not wholly) supplanted a water law doctrine called riparianism that previously
had taken hold in states located east of the Hundredth Meridian.83 Rich histories
accompany both Spanish and Mexican water law and riparianism, but for sake of
brevity these predecessors are noted here only as context for what had become,
eighty years before the Big Horn adjudication’s commencement, the exclusive legal
scheme for water allocation within Wyoming.
As described by Chief Justice Lucien Shaw of the California Supreme Court in the early
twentieth century, “[n]o more spectacular migration of human beings was ever known in history
than that of 1849 from all parts of the world to the gold-bearing lands of California.” Lucien Shaw,
The Development of the Law of the Waters in the West, 10 Cal. L. Rev. 443, 444 (1922).
79

80
The Hundredth Meridian is a hydrological line that runs north to south through the middle
of the Dakotas to Texas. Annual precipitation averages less than twenty inches westward of this line,
although there is a good deal of variation in precipitation patterns across the seventeen contiguous
western states. U.S. Department of the Interior, U.S. Geological Survey, The National Atlas
of the United States of America, Precipitation (2005), available at http://nationalmap.gov/
small_scale/printable/images/pdf/precip/pageprecip_us3.pdf.
81
Excellent sources on the history of the prior appropriation doctrine include Donald J.
Pisani, To Reclaim a Divided West: Water, Law, and Public Policy, 1848-1902 11–38 (1992);
Charles F. Wilkinson, Crossing the Next Meridian: Land, Water, and the Future of the
West 231–35 (1992); Donald J. Pisani, Enterprise and Equity: A Critique of Western Water Law in
the Nineteenth Century, 18 W. Hist. Q. 15 (1987); Robert G. Dunbar, Forging New Rights in
Western Waters 59–85 (1983).
82
Excellent sources on Spanish and Mexican water law in the American West, including its
treatment by U.S. courts after the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, include Norris Hundley, Jr., The
Great Thirst: Californians and Water: A History 27–64 (rev. ed. 2001); Peter L. Reich, The
“Hispanic” Roots of Prior Appropriation in Arizona, 27 Ariz. St. L.J. 649 (1995); Peter L. Reich,
Mission Revival Jurisprudence: State Courts and Hispanic Water Law Since 1850, 69 Wash. L. Rev.
869 (1994); Michael C. Meyer, Water in the Hispanic Southwest: A Social and Legal History,
1550–1850 (1984).

Excellent sources on the history of riparianism include Theodore Steinberg: Indus
New England (2003); Morton Horwitz, The Transformation
of American Law 1780-1860, at 31– 62 (1977).
83

trialization and the Waters of
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It was again James Marshall’s fever-inducing discovery of gold at Sutter’s
Mill on January 24, 1848, that precipitated the landmark event of U.S. history
that gave rise to prior appropriation.84 The doctrine initially originated as an
extralegal scheme for allocating surface water among Forty-Niners working
claims in the foothills of the Sierra Nevada Mountains. Roughly five years after
these trespassers on the public domain had espoused prior appropriation as
their informal system, the California Supreme Court would transmogrify it into
formal legal doctrine in the seminal case of Irwin v. Phillips.85 Leaving many dots
associated with the doctrine’s subsequent diffusion across the western states and
territories unconnected for now, it suffices to say that prior appropriation spread
as a legal transplant across the region during the half-century following Irwin v.
Phillips.86 Some western states and territories abided by the Colorado Supreme
Court’s historic 1882 decision in Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., regarding prior
appropriation as their exclusive water law doctrine, and disavowing any application
of riparianism (retrospective or prospective) within their borders.87 Other states
and territories followed the trail blazed by the California Supreme Court in the
epic case of Lux v. Haggin in 1886.88 Prior appropriation and riparianism would
co-exist in these jurisdictions—albeit for a limited time in most instances.89 The
federal government’s attitude toward prior appropriation’s genesis and diffusion
initially was one of acquiescence. After the Civil War, however, Congress expressly
sanctioned the doctrine, and water rights that had been acquired under it, in the
1866 Mining Act, the 1870 Amendment to that Act, and the Desert Land Act
of 1877.90 It was in this incremental manner that “the customs of the miners
[became] the law of western waters.”91
Reflecting the nature of its birthplace among the Forty-Niners, prior
appropriation’s key doctrinal tenets have remained twofold in the roughly 160
years since the California Gold Rush. First, the existence and scope of water rights
founded on the doctrine, “appropriative rights,” hinge on ongoing “beneficial
use” of water resources afforded to holders of these rights—in short, “use it or

84

White, supra note 34, at 191.

85

5 Cal. 140 (1855).

86

See, e.g., Dunbar, supra note 81, at 73–85.

Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882). This singular recognition of prior
appropriation and disavowal of riparianism came to be known as the Colorado Doctrine. See, e.g.,
Dunbar, supra note 81, at 81–84.
87

88

Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255 (1886).

This dual recognition of prior appropriation and riparianism came to be known as the
California Doctrine. See, e.g., Dunbar, supra note 81, at 84–85.
89

90

See, e.g., id. at 76 –77.

91

Id. at 85.
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lose it.”92 Second, if inadequate water supplies exist to satisfy all parties whose
appropriative rights attach to a water source, temporal priority governs which
parties will be entitled to use available water. “First in time, first in right” is
the shorthand expression of this tenet.93 Parties with appropriative rights that
bear older (“senior”) priority dates are authorized to make full use of the water
resources to which they are entitled before holders of appropriative rights with
more recent (“junior”) priority dates are entitled to any remainder.
Wyoming’s legal history exemplifies prior appropriation’s doctrinal evolution
as surveyed here.94 Legislation involving the doctrine was fairly abundant across
the territorial period, elapsing from 1868 to 1890,95 with prior appropriation’s
tenets appearing in various forms in statutes enacted by the territorial legislature
in 1869, 1876, 1886, and 1888.96 This trajectory continued with the Wyoming
Constitution’s formation in 1889.97 After declaring “[t]he water of all natural
streams, springs, lakes or other collections of still water, within the boundaries
of the state . . . to be property of the state,”98 Article VIII of the constitution
provided in relation to water rights that “[p]riority of appropriation for beneficial
uses shall give the better right.”99 This article established a “Board of Control”
charged with supervising the “waters of the state” and “their appropriation,
distribution, and diversion.”100 Positioned as president of the Board of Control
would be a “State Engineer” appointed by the governor who would be charged
with “general supervision of the waters of the state and of the officers connected
with its distribution.”101 Seven years after these provisions had been formulated,
in 1896, the Wyoming Supreme Court disavowed any application of riparianism
within the state, historically or prospectively, in the seminal case of Moyer v.

Id. at 61 (discussing miners’ extension of beneficial use and temporal priority tenets from
mineral resources to water resources). See, e.g., Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-3-101 (2013) (“Beneficial use
shall be the basis, the measure and limit of the right to use water at all times . . . .”).
92

93

Dunbar, supra note 81, at 61.

Excellent historical surveys of Wyoming water law can be found in Lawrence J.
MacDonnell, Treatise on Wyoming Water Law (2014) and Cooper, supra note 75. The
provisions of the Wyoming Statutes governing water resources appear in Title 41. These statutes
can be accessed at Wyoming Legislative Service Office, Statutes, http://legisweb.state.wy.us/statutes/
statutes.aspx (last visited March 17, 2015).
94

95
An act to provide a temporary Government for the Territory of Wyoming, 15 Stat. 178
(1868); An act to provide for the admission of the State of Wyoming into the Union, and for other
purposes, 26 Stat. 222 (1890).
96

MacDonnell, supra note 94, at 1–8; Cooper, supra note 75, at 10–17.

97

MacDonnell, supra note 94, at 8–10; Cooper, supra note 75, at 17–18.

98

Wyo. Const. art. VIII, § 1.

99

Id. § 3.

100

Id. § 2.

101

Id. § 5.
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Preston.102 The court subscribed to the view previously espoused by other lawannouncing courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court two decades earlier, that
appropriative rights and the obligation to protect them had “existed anterior to
any legislation upon the subject.”103 Many more details could be shared regarding
prior appropriation’s history in Wyoming, but it is again enough to say that the
doctrine had become the state’s exclusive water law regime eighty years before the
Big Horn adjudication.104

2. Reserved Rights Doctrine
Prior appropriation, of course, was not the only operative water law doctrine
in the American West at the Big Horn adjudication’s onset, however—far from
it. Another doctrine rooted in federal law—the “reserved rights” doctrine—also
occupied the field. This doctrine’s evolution can be traced to the seminal cases of
Rio Grande and Winans decided by the U.S. Supreme Court around the turn of
the twentieth century.105 For purposes of this piece, however, it was the Court’s
landmark decisions in Winters and Arizona v. California that spawned the legal
rules of greatest import to Big Horn.106 Winters involved an 1888 agreement
that created the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation in Montana,107 and the then
novel issue of whether this instrument implicitly had reserved flows from the
Milk River and its tributaries for use by the Gros Ventre and Assiniboine Tribes
when establishing the reservation.108 Did these tribes hold a reserved water right
under federal law stemming from the 1888 Agreement? Historians have produced

102

44 P. 845 (Wyo. 1896).

Id. at 847. As described by the court, “the imperative and growing necessities of our
conditions . . . , to say nothing of the other beneficial uses . . . to which water has been and may be
applied, have compelled the recognition, rather than the adoption, of the law of prior appropriation.”
Id. This text and the court’s view regarding the precedent extralegal origin of appropriative rights
mirrored the Colorado Supreme Court’s decision in Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443,
446–47 (1882). In turn, the Colorado Supreme Court had relied in Coffin on an earlier decision of
the U.S. Supreme Court interpreting the 1866 Mining Act as reflecting a “voluntary recognition of
a pre-existing right of possession, constituting a valid claim to its continued use, [rather] than the
establishment of a new one.” Broder v. Notoma Water & Mining Co., 101 U.S. 274, 276 (1879)
(emphasis omitted).
103

Article XIII of the Wyoming Constitution applied prior appropriation to surface water—
“natural streams, springs, lakes or other collections of still water”—but over half a century would
pass before the doctrine was extended to groundwater through legislation enacted in 1945, 1947,
and 1957. MacDonnell, supra note 94, at 51, 53, 55–56; Cooper, supra note 75, at 64–65, 71–72.
104

105
United States v. Rio Grande Ditch & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899); United States v.
Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
106

Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).

107

25 Stat. 113 (1888).

108

Winters, 207 U.S. at 575–77.
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rich scholarship on Winters and the broader context surrounding it,109 but the
Court’s short answer to this question was “yes.”110 Founded on Winters, Indian
reserved rights thus serve to fulfill the particular purpose(s) for which individual
Indian reservations were created—e.g., agriculture in the case of the Fort Belknap
Reservation.111 They resemble appropriative rights in that they bear priority
dates that either stem from the creation date of the reservation or in some cases
from “time immemorial.”112 On the other hand, they differ from appropriative
rights in that their existence does not hinge on ongoing beneficial use of the
water resources to which they attach—i.e., non-use of these resources does not
subject Indian reserved rights to potential abandonment or forfeiture.113 Winters
did not clarify the precise standard according to which Indian reserved rights
would be quantified, but the Court addressed this issue roughly sixty years later
in the principal case of the Arizona v. California litigation, announcing that the
practicably irrigable acreage (PIA) standard applied in the case of reservations that
had been created for agricultural purposes.114 This standard entails quantifying
the scope of reserved rights by assessing the acreage of land on a given reservation
that is deemed practicably irrigable based upon the factors of arability, engineering
feasibility, and economic feasibility.115
In addition to laying a foundation for Indian reserved rights, Winters also
served as the basis for a related branch of the reserved rights doctrine dealing
with water rights held by the United States for federal lands other than Indian
reservations.116 Arizona v. California was the case that extended Winters in this
Such scholarship includes John Shurts, Indian Reserved Water Rights: The Winters
Doctrine and Its Social and Legal Context, 1880s-1930s (2000); Norris Hundley, Jr., The
“Winters” Decision and Indian Water Rights: A Mystery Reexamined, 13 W. Hist. Q. 17 (1982);
Norris Hundley, Jr., The Dark and Bloody Ground of Indian Water Rights: Confusion Elevated to
Principle, 9 W. Hist. Q. 454 (1978). See also The Future of Indian and Federal Reserved Water
Rights: The Winters Centennial 53–77 (Barbara Cosens and Judith V. Royster eds., 2012)
(containing remarks of Patricia Limerick and John Shurts on Winters in its historical context). The
Winters centennial compilation also contains re-creations of the oral arguments in Winters, Arizona
v. California, and U.S. v. New Mexico—the “primary cases of the reserved rights doctrine.” Id. at
22–52.
109

110
Winters, 207 U.S. at 576–77 (holding that there was a reservation of waters under the
1888 agreement and that Montana’s subsequent admission into the Union in 1889 did not repeal
this reservation).
111

Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law 1180 (2005) [hereinafter Cohen’s Handbook].

Id. at 1179. To elaborate, “[i]f water was reserved for uses or purposes that did not exist
before the reservation was established, the priority date is the date the reservation was created.” Id.
Conversely, “if water was reserved for the continuation of an aboriginal practice, the priority date is
time immemorial.” Id.
112

113

Id. at 1169.

114

Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 600–601 (1963).

115

Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 111, at 1185.

An excellent survey of federal reserved rights can be found in Michael C. Blumm, Reserved
Water Rights, in Water and Water Rights 37-52.1 to 37-82 (Amy K. Kelley ed., 2012).
116
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manner. In a single paragraph near the end of the majority’s almost sixty-page
opinion, the Court placed its imprimatur on a conclusion that had been reached
by Special Master Simon Rifkind earlier in this epic lawsuit: “the principle
underlying the reservation of water rights for Indian Reservations was equally
applicable to other federal establishments,” including the national forest, national
recreation area, and national wildlife refuges involved in the case.117 This holding
gave rise to federal reserved rights as a counterpart to Indian reserved rights, with
the former bearing similar key features to the latter—namely, (1) priority dates
tethered to the creation date of the relevant federal reservation, and (2) legal
existence that does not depend upon ongoing beneficial use. Quantification of
federal reserved rights, however, is a feature that distinguishes these two strands of
the reserved rights doctrine. The seminal cases of Cappaert and U.S. v. New Mexico
grappled with this distinction in the decade following Arizona v. California.118
Because the Court decided U.S. v. New Mexico one year after the Big Horn
adjudication had begun, my coverage of its implications for quantifying federal
reserved rights is included in the next Part. For now, it is worth highlighting that
the Court described in Cappaert—which was decided in 1976 approximately one
year before the adjudication commenced—that the legal scope of federal reserved
rights encompassed “only that amount of water necessary to fulfill the purpose of
the reservation, no more.”119
Beyond appropriative rights, Indian reserved rights, and federal reserved
rights, one final dimension of the allocational jurisprudence that existed at the
Big Horn adjudication’s genesis deserves mention. This dimension concerns water
rights held by different types of parties who, in one form or another, acquired
private interests in lands located on Indian reservations that had been subject to
allotment. Such allotment occurred, in some instances, by the express provisions
of treaties creating reservations. Article 6 of the Second Treaty of Fort Bridger—
again, the treaty establishing the Wind River Indian Reservation—offers one
example. Tailored to tribal members who were the head of a family and desired
“to commence farming,” this article authorized allotment of tracts of up to
320 acres to these individuals, “which tract shall cease to be held in common”
and “may be held in the exclusive possession of the person selecting it, and of
his family, so long as he or they may continue to cultivate it.”120 This article
similarly provided for allotment of tracts of up to 80 acres to tribal members over
117
See Arizona, 373 U.S. at 601 (recognizing reserved rights for Lake Mead National
Recreation Area, Havasu Lake National Wildlife Refuge, Imperial National Wildlife Refuge, and
Gila National Forest).
118
United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978); Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S.
128 (1976).
119
Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 141. See also id. (describing district court’s injunction curtailing
groundwater pumping as “very appropriately” tailored to “minimal need” for fulfilling purposes of
federal reservation).
120

Second Treaty, supra note 50, at Art. 6.
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eighteen years of age who were not the head of a family.121 In addition to treaty
provisions of this sort, allotment also occurred in a systematic manner under the
General Allotment Act of 1887.122 It involved two key measures: (1) allotment of
parcels of commonly owned reservation land to individual tribal members, and
(2) opening of commonly owned reservation land not allotted to individual tribal
members (often deemed “surplus”) to entry and purchase by non-Indians under
the disposal era statutes.123 From a national perspective, of the 140-million acres
of reservation land that existed at the dawn of the allotment era, 90-million acres
had passed to non-Indians upon the era’s close in 1934.124
What were the respective water rights, if any, held by Indian allottees, nonIndian successors to these allottees, and non-Indians that took up “surplus” lands
on ceded portions of reservations? The U.S. Supreme Court and lower federal
courts grappled with different aspects of this multi-part question in several major
cases leading up to the Big Horn adjudication.
With regard to Indian allottees, the Court held in the 1939 case of Powers that
“when allotments of land were duly made for exclusive use [of tribal members]
and thereafter conveyed in fee, the right to use some portion of tribal waters
essential for cultivation passed to the owners.”125 Although the Court declined
to address “the extent or precise nature” of the water rights held by the Indian
allottees in the case, it made clear that these rights indeed did extend from the
reserved right held by their tribe (Crow) under an 1868 treaty.126
As for the water rights of non-Indian parties that purchased Indian allotments
(“non-Indian successors”), the Ninth Circuit developed seminal jurisprudence in
this area during the first few years of the Big Horn adjudication as described in
the next Part.127 One pre-Big Horn decision by the District Court for the Eastern

121

Id.

24 Stat. 388 (1887). As described by the Ninth Circuit in Colville, “[t]he General Allot
ment Act represented the shift in federal objectives from segregation of Indians on reservations to
assimilation of them in non-Indian culture and society.” Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton,
647 F.2d 42, 49 (9th Cir. 1981).
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Id. at 533. See also Blumm, supra note 116, at 37–50 (describing in relation to Powers that
“the Supreme Court long ago recognized . . . Indian allottees obtain a ratable portion of the tribal
reserved water right.”).
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District of Idaho, however, is notable: Hibner.128 Predating Big Horn by a half
century, the court in this case addressed, in relevant part, the nature and extent
of water rights held by non-Indian successors who had purchased allotments in
a ceded portion of the Fort Hall Indian Reservation. A non-Indian successor
“acquires, as under other sales, the title and rights held by the Indians,” concluded
the court, and “there should be awarded to such purchaser the same character of
water right with equal priority as those of the Indians.”129 The Indian allottees’
water rights thus passed to their non-Indian successors in the court’s view, and
the priority date of the tribe’s reserved right persisted through this transfer. That
said, the court then went on to describe how the “status” of these water rights
changed due to this transaction, such that the amount of water use permitted
by a non-Indian successor would be based on the “actual acreage that was under
irrigation at the time title passed from the Indians, and such increased acreage as
he might with reasonable diligence place under irrigation.”130
Last but not least in this area of the allocational jurisprudence are the water
rights of non-Indians who acquired title to “surplus” lands opened for entry
under the disposal era laws. California Oregon Power is the relevant precedent.131
Announced by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1935, it addressed whether a patent
issued in 1885 under the Homestead Act of 1862 carried with it a common law
riparian right for the patentee (i.e., as opposed to title to the land alone).132 The
Court held “no.” It construed the Desert Land Act of 1877—and potentially the
Mining Act of 1866 and its 1870 Amendment133—as having effected a “severance
of all waters upon the public domain, not theretofore appropriated, from the
land itself.”134 Accordingly, “following the act of 1877, if not before,”135 a patent
issued “in a desert-land state or territory, under any of the land laws of the United
States, carried with it . . . no common law right to the water flowing through or
bordering upon the lands conveyed.”136 Rather, patentees seeking to obtain water

United States v. Hibner, 27 F.2d 909 (E.D. Idaho 1928). In reaching its decision in Hibner,
the district court relied on an opinion released by the Ninth Circuit seven years earlier in Skeem
v. United States, 273 F. 93, 96 (1921) (holding that Indian allottees held water rights stemming
from tribe’s reserved right under 1898 treaty, and that allottees retained water rights despite their
non-occupation and leasing of parcels to non-Indians).
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rights would have to proceed under the legal doctrine of their respective state, as
the disposal era statutes themselves did not afford a basis for these parties’ water
rights under federal law.

B. Jurisdictional Jurisprudence
Whereas the preceding material conveys a general sense of existent types
of water rights at the time of the Big Horn adjudication’s commencement, a
related matter concerns whether federal or state courts were the proper forum for
addressing the existence, nature, and scope of these water rights. Nevada Senator
Pat McCarran thought the latter in relation to reserved rights. With the enactment
of an appropriations rider called the “McCarran Amendment” in 1952, he secured
federal legislation that (as later interpreted by the Supreme Court) brought state
courts to the forefront in shaping and applying the reserved rights doctrine.137
Taken together, this amendment and the Supreme Court’s decisions construing it
made up a jurisdictional backdrop to the Big Horn adjudication that arguably was
as important as its allocational counterpart.
Stated broadly, the McCarran Amendment’s general aim was to address the
co-existence of appropriative and reserved rights in river systems throughout the
American West. It was by waiving the federal government’s sovereign immunity,
so as to enable it to be sued in state court proceedings called “general stream
adjudications,” that the amendment pursued this goal.138 More specifically, the
amendment provided, in relevant part:
Consent is given to join the United States as a defendant in any
suit (1) for the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a
river system or other source, or (2) for the administration of
such rights, where it appears that the United States is the owner
or is in the process of acquiring water rights by appropriation
under State law, by purchase, by exchange, or otherwise, and the
United States is a necessary party to such suit.139
Under these particular circumstances, the United States would be precluded
from invoking sovereign immunity as a defense and would be “subject to the
judgments, orders, and decrees of the court having jurisdiction.”140 As described
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The McCarran Amendment is codified at 43 U.S.C. § 666 (2013).

For an excellent and exhaustive overview of the history of general stream adjudications, see
John E. Thorson et al., Dividing Western Waters: A Century of Adjudicating Rivers and Streams, 8 U.
Denv. L. Rev. 352, (2005) (Dividing Western Waters I ); John E. Thorson et al., Dividing Western
Waters: A Century of Adjudicating Rivers and Streams, Part II, 9 U. Denv. L. Rev. 299 (2006)
(Dividing Western Waters II ).
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by Senator McCarran himself, the amendment’s purpose was thus “to allow the
United States to be joined in a suit wherein it is necessary to adjudicate all of
the rights of various owners on a given stream.”141 Such joinder was necessary, in
the senator’s view, “because unless all of the parties owning or in the process of
acquiring water rights on a particular stream can be joined as parties defendant,
any subsequent decree would be of little value.”142
Not only had Congress enacted the McCarran Amendment more than two
decades prior to the onset of the Big Horn adjudication, but the Supreme Court
also had handed down several major decisions interpreting and applying the
amendment. Dugan v. Rank clarified in 1963 that a “private suit” to determine
water rights between a group of water users along California’s San Joaquin River
and the United States and local Bureau of Reclamation officials did not constitute
a “general adjudication of ‘all of the rights of various owners on a given stream’”
as required to invoke the amendment.143 Announced eight years later, the Court
came to a contrary conclusion in Eagle County, construing the amendment’s
phrase “rights to the use of water of a river system” as sufficiently broad to embrace
reserved rights held by the federal government for the White River National
Forest in Colorado, and thereby allowing the United States to be joined in an
adjudication of the Eagle River System.144 The State of Wyoming joined ten other
western states in filing amici briefs in this case.145 The Court reiterated its holding
in Eagle County in a companion case, Water Division No. 5, which concerned a
more far-reaching state court adjudication in Colorado involving reserved rights
held by the United States for four national forests and a host of other federal
lands.146 Moving forward, Colorado River, which was decided by the Court in
1976, extended these federal reserved rights holdings to Indian reserved rights.147
“[V]iewing the Government’s trusteeship of Indian rights as ownership,” the
Court proclaimed, “the logic of [Eagle County and Water Division No. 5] clearly
extends to such rights.”148 Colorado River also clarified that federal courts shared
concurrent jurisdiction with state courts over reserved rights claims—i.e., the
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Id. A useful overview of the McCarran Amendment’s legal history can be found in Dividing
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Senator Pat McCarran and the Great American Communist Hunt (2004) (providing biography
of Senator McCarran).
142

143

Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 618–619 (1963).

United States v. District Court in and for the County of Eagle, 401 U.S. 520,
523–24 (1971).
144

145

Id. at 521.

United States v. District Court in and for Water Division No. 5, 401 U.S. 527,
527–28 (1971).
146

147

Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 810 (1976).

148

Id.

266

Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 15

McCarran Amendment had not repealed federal jurisdiction.149 At the same time,
however, the Court enunciated factors related to “wise judicial administration”
that might justify federal dismissal of reserved right suits in lieu of concurrent
state proceedings.150 Most important among these factors was the McCarran
Amendment’s “clear federal policy” of avoiding “piecemeal adjudication of water
rights in a river system.”151

IV. Big Horn General Stream Adjudication
It was against the backdrop of the allocational and jurisdictional jurisprudence
outlined above that the State of Wyoming commenced the Big Horn adjudication
in 1977. Thirty-seven years later, in 2014, a final order concluding the adjudication
would issue. The U.S. Supreme Court and lower federal courts would render
several significant reserved rights and jurisdictional decisions across this time
period building on the preceding precedents. One might view the litigation
spawned by the Big Horn adjudication itself as a salient part of the evolution of this
legal doctrine. Important milestones within this litigation appear throughout the
discussion below and collectively constitute an extensive body of law consisting
of special master reports, district court judgments and decrees, Wyoming
Supreme Court opinions, and one U.S. Supreme Court per curiam decision. All
told, the state and federal judicial officials who were responsible for moving the
adjudication along at the ground level within the State of Wyoming, including
issuing numerous and often intensely contested rulings underlying the appellate
decisions that comprise the law of the case, included no less than six judges and six
special masters. The judges and their respective tenures consisted of Harold Joffe
(1977–1983), Ewing Kerr (1977), Alan Johnson (1983–1986), Gary Hartman
(1986–2008), Nancy Guthrie (2008–2010), and Robert Skar (2010–2014). The
special masters and their respective tenures included Teno Roncalio (1979–1985),
Carolyn Patterson (1985–1986), Terrance Dolan (1986–1993), Nancy Guthrie
(1993–1994), William Schwartz (1994–1997), and Ramsey Kropf (1994–2014).
As will become clear from the material that follows, the Big Horn adjudication
ultimately assumed a three-phase structure that would frame its entire duration.
The initial section below begins by examining foundational procedural matters
vetted during the first three-and-a-half years of the proceeding to form this threephase structure. With this background laid out, the remaining four sections survey
the adjudication’s three phases and its eventual closure by the district court. Each
phase focused on distinct yet interconnected types of water rights—specifically,
(1) the Indian reserved right and derivative water rights of Indian and non-Indian
parties, (2) federal reserved rights, and (3) appropriative rights. Notwithstanding
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their distinct coverage, however, there was a good deal of temporal overlap between
the phases. Because of this dynamic, in an effort to canvass the adjudication as
clearly as possible, the discussion considers each phase in full before circling back
chronologically to the next one.

A. Foundations
1. Commencement
Slightly less than a year passed after the Supreme Court decided Colorado
River in 1976 before the Big Horn adjudication arose.152 Its genesis can be traced
to a dispute during the previous year between tribal authorities and the City
of Riverton, Wyoming, over the city’s planned drilling of groundwater wells
to augment supplies for Riverton Municipal Airport and an industrial park.153
Contending this groundwater was subject to their reserved right under Winters,
the tribes informed the city they objected to drilling of the wells. This objection
raised a foundational issue about the tribes’ reserved right. On January 14,
1977, House Bill 188 was introduced in the Wyoming Legislature in response
to this issue. Passing the House and Senate during the following week—without
amendment and with literal or virtual unanimity in both chambers—Governor Ed
Herschler signed the bill into law as W.S. § 1-37-106 on January 22, 1977.154 This
statute authorized the State of Wyoming, acting through the Attorney General,
to “institute an action to have determined in a general adjudication the nature,
extent, and relative priority of the water rights of all persons in any river system

As described by the Wyoming Supreme Court twenty-five years later: “The purpose of
the adjudication was to resolve the issue of what water rights the federal government reserved for
the Wind River Indian Reservation’s benefit.” In re the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use
Water in the Big Horn River System and All Other Sources, 48 P.3d 1040, 1043 (Wyo. 2002) (Big
Horn VI ).
152

Teno Roncalio, Special Master, Report Concerning Reserved Water Right Claims by and
on Behalf of the Tribes of the Wind River Indian Reservation 7 (December 15, 1982), available
at http://bhrac.washakiecounty.net/DocumentCenter/BHCR/12151982RoncRep.pdf [hereinafter
Roncalio Report]. As described several years later by Special Master Roncalio in his report: “It was
obvious that an adjudication was at last necessary which would once and for all quantify, define, and
integrate the rights of all people, Indian and non-Indian, to the use of waters in Water Division 3.”
Id. at 8. See also Williams, supra note 9, at 170 (providing description of adjudication’s genesis from
tribes’ Supreme Court advocate Susan Williams). A slightly different (but not necessarily opposing)
angle on the adjudication’s genesis appears in Joseph R. Membrino, Indian Reserved Water Rights,
Federalism and the Trust Responsibility, 27 Land & Water L. Rev. 1, 29 n.101 (“A principal reason
for the filing of the [Big Horn adjudication] was because of concern in the 1970’s that the mineral
development boom in Wyoming would require water resources that were subject to Indian reserved
water rights claims.”).
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Roncalio Report, supra note 153, at 14. See also O’Gara, supra note 14, at 175 (quoting
former Wyoming legislator Walt Urbigkit’s description of the statute as “the fastest law ever enacted
in history.”)
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and all other sources . . . .”155 It then went on to prescribe the duties of a court
conducting such a general adjudication: (1) “[c]ertify to the state board of control
those legal and factual issues which the court deems appropriate for the board to
determine”; (2) “[c]onfirm those rights evidenced by previous court decrees, or
by certificates of appropriation, or by certificates of construction” that had been
issued by the Board of Control; (3) “[d]etermine the status of all uncancelled
permits to acquire the right to the use of the water of the state of Wyoming and
adjudicate all perfected rights” under these permits; (4) “[d]etermine the extent
and priority date of and adjudicate any interest in or right to use the water of the
river system and all other sources not otherwise represented” by the foregoing
decrees, certificates, and permits; and (5) “[e]stablish . . . one or more tabulations
or lists of all water rights and their relative priorities on the river system and all
other sources.”156
Two days after passage of the adjudication statute, Wyoming Attorney
General Frank Mendicino filed a complaint pursuant to it on January 24, 1977,
in the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District in Washakie County.157 Tracking
the adjudication statute’s text, the complaint provided that “[t]his is a suit for
the general adjudication of the nature, extent, and relative priority of the water
rights of all persons in the Big Horn River System . . . and all other sources in
Water Division Number Three . . . .”158 As delineated by the complaint, the water
resources subject to the adjudication encompassed “the Big Horn River, all surface
streams and rivers tributary thereto, including but not limited to the Wind River,
and all ground and underground tributary thereto,” as well as “all other surface
and ground waters underlying or within Water Division Number Three.”159
With regard to the water rights associated with these sources, the complaint’s
prayer incorporated the statutory text. It requested that the court (1) “[c]onfirm
those rights evidenced by previous court decrees, by certificates of appropriation,
or by certificates of construction” previously issued by the Board of Control;
(2) “[d]etermine the status of all uncancelled permits to acquire the right to the
use of the water of the State of Wyoming and adjudicate all perfected rights” under

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-37-106(a) (2013). The statute defined “general adjudication” as “the
judicial determination or establishment of the extent and priority of the rights to use water of
all persons on any river system and all other sources within the state of Wyoming.” Id. § 1-37-106(a)
(i)(A).
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In re the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System
and All Other Sources, Complaint (January 24, 1977), available at http://bhrac.washakiecounty.
net/DocumentCenter/BHCR/9VK3VS0000.pdf [hereinafter Complaint]. The adjudication statute
provided that “[w]hen the water rights to be determined are located in more than one (1) county,
the general adjudication may be brought in any of the counties.” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-37-106(a)
(iv) (2013).
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these permits that had not been adjudicated; and (3) “[d]etermine the extent and
priority date of and adjudicate any interest in or right to use the water of the River
System and all other sources in Water Division Number Three . . . not otherwise
represented” by the foregoing decrees, certificates, or permits.160 The complaint
also requested that the court “find and order” the United States had waived its
sovereign immunity and had consented to be joined in the adjudication via the
McCarran Amendment.161
The State of Wyoming would not wait long for its requests to be answered.
On the same day the complaint was filed—again, January 24, 1977—Fifth
District Judge Harold Joffe issued an order initiating the Big Horn adjudication.
Responding to the complaint, the court found and ordered, in relevant part, that
“this action is a general adjudication of all water rights on the Big Horn River
System and all other sources in Water Division Number Three,” and that “the
United States of America by its enactment of [the McCarran Amendment] has
waived its sovereign immunity and consented to be joined in the action.”162 Word
of the adjudication’s commencement followed in a notice issued by the court one
week later.163

2. Forum and Jurisdiction
Roughly a year would be invested after the Big Horn adjudication’s
commencement into addressing issues concerning whether federal or state court
was the proper forum for the action, and whether the United States indeed had
waived its sovereign immunity, and had consented to be joined in the action,
based upon the McCarran Amendment’s relationship to the adjudication statute.
Something of a back-and-forth rally took place across this period stemming from
a sequence of requests for removal, remand, and dismissal of the adjudication.
Having received Judge Joffe’s order of January 24, 1977, initiating the
adjudication, the United States one month later petitioned for removal of the
action from state to federal court—i.e., from the District Court of the Fifth
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Order (Jan. 24, 1977), available at http://bhrac.washakiecounty.net/DocumentCenter/
BHCR/OI1GVW0000.pdf.
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Notice of Water Adjudication for Big Horn River System and All Other Sources of
Water Water Division Number Three State of Wyoming (Feb. 1, 1977), available at http://bhrac.
washakiecounty.net/DocumentCenter/BHCR/72VGZ70000.pdf. The notice identified the four
types of state law-based water rights and interests that had been addressed in the complaint: decrees,
certificates, non-defaulted permits, and defaulted but uncancelled permits. It then stated that the
United States had been joined in the adjudication, in both its proprietary and trustee capacities, and
explained that “[t]he water rights which may be asserted by the United States may well be entitled
to earlier priority dates than some or all” of the state law-based water rights and interests. Id.
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Judicial District of Washakie County to the U.S. District Court for the District
of Wyoming in Cheyenne.164 The United States raised a host of arguments in
support of removal that proved pervasive throughout this foundational period,
including that the adjudication’s “primary purpose” was “to determine Federal
rights,” and that “the hastily prepared machinery established for a determination
of these rights by the State of Wyoming [did] not provide an adequate forum
for their determination.”165 Questions of federal law concerning the nature and
extent of the reserved rights involved in the adjudication, as well as the McCarran
Amendment’s applicability or inapplicability to the adjudication statute, warranted
removal according to the United States.166 Only the U.S. District Court would
have “the expertise required for addressing such critical [federal] questions,” and
the McCarran Amendment did not prohibit the court from exercising concurrent
jurisdiction as established in Colorado River.167 In contrast, to permit the state’s
Board of Control to address reserved rights claims—as special master in the
adjudication—would be inappropriate and exceed the bounds of the McCarran
Amendment, as the board had “no experience in determining Federal rights” and
was “an administrative creature of the State.”168 Rather, “[t]his Court and a master
appointed by this Court would provide the appropriate neutral tribunal for an
adjudication of these rights.”169
U.S. District Judge Ewing T. Kerr initially obliged the United States’ petition,
ordering removal of the adjudication to federal court one day after the petition’s
filing.170 This outcome would not withstand the test of time, however—or, more
specifically, a motion to remand the case to state court filed by the State of Wyoming
the following month.171 Characterizing the petition for removal as a “procedural
device to circumvent the clear intent and purpose of the McCarran Amendment,”
the state contended removal would “emasculate” the amendment’s purpose
and “undermine the efforts of the western states to adjudicate and administer

164
Petition for Removal (February 22, 1977), available at http://bhrac.washakiecounty.net/
DocumentCenter/BHCR/HCP2WR0000.pdf.

Memorandum in Support of Petition for Removal 2 (February 22, 1977), available at
http://bhrac.washakiecounty.net/DocumentCenter/BHCR/4VMJQ20000.pdf. With regard to its
allegations of haste, the United States quoted remarks attributed to Wyoming Attorney General
Frank Mendicino in the Casper Star Tribune describing that “a special bill was passed to allow for
this adjudication because ‘we were concerned that if it became apparent that we were about to file
in state court, the Government might sue us in federal court.’” Id.
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water rights within their boundaries.”172 Implicit “concurrent nonremovable
jurisdiction” existed under the Supreme Court’s precedents according to the
state, and the factors enunciated in Colorado River supported a remand.173 The
state asserted no well-founded argument could be made that the adjudication
statute exceeded the McCarran Amendment’s scope. Rather, sufficient judicial
control existed over the adjudication,174 as required by the amendment, despite
the statutory provision authorizing certification of legal and factual issues to the
Board of Control.175
At the end of the day, the state got the better of this removal-and-remand
exchange, with Judge Kerr remanding the case to Wyoming’s Fifth Judicial
District Court on May 24, 1977,176 in line with the state’s arguments.177 These
arguments would not sit idle for long, however, as they would be called back
into service and supplemented three months later in response to motions for
dismissal filed by the United States178 and the tribes.179 The United States sought
dismissal of the adjudication on one familiar and one unfamiliar ground. The
former concerned the already broached issue of whether the adjudication statute’s
provision for certifying legal and factual questions to the Board of Control
rendered the proceeding insufficiently judicial so as to fall outside the McCarran
Amendment.180 In conjunction with this ground, the United States reiterated its
skepticism about the board’s ability to serve as an “impartial forum” for reserved
rights claims.181 To these existing arguments the United States added a new
ground: jurisdiction was lacking due to a provision of the Wyoming Constitution
disclaiming “all right and title to the unappropriated public lands” within the
state’s boundaries and “to all lands lying within [these boundaries] owned or
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Id. at 21. Nor did the state deem the “expeditious manner” in which the adjudication was
filed relevant to the court’s “determination of the capability of the Wyoming system to conduct
these proceedings.” Id. at 22.
174

175

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-37-106(a)(i)(A)(1) (2013).

Order (May 31, 1977), available at http://bhrac.washakiecounty.net/DocumentCenter/
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Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 2–5 (May 31, 1977), available at http://bhrac.
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Motion to Dismiss the Complaint (August 22, 1977), available at http://bhrac.washakie
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Motion of the Shoshone and Arapahoe Tribes of the Wind River Indian Reservation for
Leave to File a Brief Amicus Curiae, and Amicus Curiae (August 18, 1977), available at http://bhrac.
washakiecounty.net/DocumentCenter/BHCR/XFLLWT0000.pdf [hereinafter Tribes Motion].
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held by an Indian or Indian tribes.”182 “[S]aid Indian land shall remain under
the absolute jurisdiction and control of the [C]ongress of the United States”
declared the provision,183 which the United States construed as precluding state
jurisdiction over both Indian lands and water reserved in connection with such
lands.184 The tribes supplemented the United States’ two bases for dismissal with a
third in an amicus brief. Its essence was twofold: (1) the tribes were indispensable
parties to the litigation because their water rights were at issue and the United
States was unable to provide adequate representation as their trustee, yet
(2) the tribes could not be joined in the adjudication because they had not waived
their sovereign immunity and the McCarran Amendment did not effect such a
waiver.185 The tribes accordingly asserted that the court should dismiss the case for
lack of jurisdiction over a necessary party.186
As had been the case with its motion to remand, the State of Wyoming
avoided dismissal of the Big Horn adjudication on the foregoing grounds. The
state’s counterarguments prompted an order from the district court denying
dismissal on February 6, 1978,187 and an accompanying letter opinion roughly
two months before.188 With regard to the adjudication statute’s certification
provision, the court concluded it did not preclude jurisdiction under the McCarran
Amendment. To the contrary, “[t]he fact that the Court under the state statute
retains complete control over the proceedings . . . fulfills the ‘suit’ requirement of
the amendment.”189 It was likewise this judicial control that in the court’s view
negated the United States’ argument regarding the Board of Control’s alleged
bias.190 Nor was the court persuaded that it lacked jurisdiction over the tribes’
water rights due to the Wyoming Constitution’s disclaimer provision.191 Finally,
the court rejected the ground for dismissal alleged by the tribes in their amicus
brief, regarding the tribes as already parties to the adjudication “inasmuch as the
United States is a proper party in its own proprietary capacity and as trustee for
182
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183
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Order (February 6, 1978), available at http://bhrac.washakiecounty.net/DocumentCenter/
BHCR/MSYFH30000.pdf. This order also disposed of two related motions that had been filed by
the State of Wyoming for judgment on the pleadings and partial summary judgment. The state’s
counterarguments are set forth in Brief in Opposition to the Defendant United States’ Motion
to Dismiss (September 28, 1977), available at http://bhrac.washakiecounty.net/DocumentCenter/
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the Tribes.”192 Appointment of private counsel for the tribes would be the proper
course of action, according to the court, for any conflict of interest between the
tribes and the United States.193 Having devoted a year to the foregoing issues of
forum and jurisdiction, it would be this matter of the tribes’ participation and
representation in the adjudication that would move to the forefront.

3. Tribal Intervention
On August 14, 1978, the Eastern Shoshone and Northern Arapaho tribes
of the Wind River Indian Reservation moved to intervene in the Big Horn
adjudication as defendants.194 This motion precipitated a three-month period of
briefing that ultimately would place the parties into a configuration that (although
unanticipated at the time) would persist for nearly four decades.
Reiterating their belief that the court had “no jurisdiction to adjudicate their
water rights,” the tribes nonetheless sought to intervene in the adjudication as a
matter of right. They assertedly met all three requirements for such intervention
under the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure: (1) their reserved right was at issue
in the litigation, (2) an adverse judgment from the court could impede their ability
to defend this right, and (3) the United States would not adequately represent
their interests.195 Underlying the tribes’ concerns about inadequate representation
was a perceived conflict of interest stemming from the United States’ assertion of
“water rights on behalf of its Forest Service and its Bureau of Reclamation.”196 The
tribes alleged that the latter agency had attempted in the past “to market waters
impounded in the Boysen Reservoir on the Wind River Reservation for a variety
of uses, not for the benefit of the tribes.”197
Although not identical, the responses of the other two sovereigns to the
tribes’ motion to intervene were similar, both focusing on the issue of inadequate
representation and its bearing on the tribes’ participation and representation
in the adjudication. No objection to intervention by the tribes came from the
United States, although it contested the tribes’ assertions regarding inadequate
representation and suggested permissive intervention, rather than intervention of
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Id. at 3.

193

Id. at 3, 5.

Motion of the Shoshone and Arapahoe Tribes to Intervene as Defendants (August 14,
1978), available at http://bhrac.washakiecounty.net/DocumentCenter/BHCR/1QFEZK0000.pdf.
194

Memorandum in Support of Motion of the Shoshone and Arapahoe Tribes to Intervene as
Defendants 1–2 (August 14, 1978), available at http://bhrac.washakiecounty.net/DocumentCenter/
BHCR/6HDK280000.pdf.
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Id. at 2.

197

Id.
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right, would be appropriate.198 The State of Wyoming drew a slightly harder line,
indicating that it had “absolutely no objection to participation in this adjudication
by the Tribes,” but that intervention of right would be “totally inappropriate.”199
Central to this argument was the state’s position that no showing had been made
“that representation has been inadequate in the past or that any conflict of interest
exists that could render it inadequate in the future.”200 “Instead, we have only
speculation by the Tribes concerning the possibility of a conflict over Boysen
Reservoir.”201 In the event any conflicts of interest were shown, substitution of
counsel would be the “better solution” contended the state, although permissive
intervention would be a “viable alternative.”202 Ultimately, however, the court
should not allow “any form of intervention, or even substitution of counsel” in
the state’s view, absent a stipulation from attorneys for the United States that they
were unable to represent the tribes’ interests adequately.203
In an order issued on November 21, 1978, Judge Joffe put this matter to rest,
granting the tribes permissive intervention into the Big Horn adjudication.204 The
court’s order specified that intervention was permitted for several interconnected
purposes, including “[t]o submit claims to federal reserved water rights held in
trust for the Tribes” and “[t]o attack competing water claims by other parties.”205
Dovetailing with these purposes was a complementary one that would prove even
more relevant in the immediate future: “[t]o oppose the Board of Control as a
Special Master for matters not yet referred to it.”206

4. Certification and Referral
“With [the] jurisdictional matters disposed of, and the parties to the action
aligned, the next issue concerned the question of whether or not the adjudication
should be certified to the Board of Control of the State of Wyoming for trial.”207
198
Response of the United States to the State of Wyoming’s Memorandum in Opposition to
Tribal Intervention (October 2, 1978), available at http://bhrac.washakiecounty.net/Document
Center/BHCR/FS1V9S0000.pdf.
199
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion of the Shoshone and Arapahoe Tribes to
Intervene as Defendants 1 (September 13, 1978), available at http://bhrac.washakiecounty.net/
DocumentCenter/BHCR/11HYV80000.pdf.
200

Id. at 7.

201

Id.

Reply of the State of Wyoming to the Memorandum of the Shoshone and Arapahoe
Tribes in Support of Their Motion to Intervene 2 (October 16, 1978), available at http://bhrac.
washakiecounty.net/DocumentCenter/BHCR/5UEDIS0000.pdf.
202

203

Id. at 3.

Order Granting Intervention 1 (November 21, 1978), available at http://bhrac.washakie
county.net/DocumentCenter/BHCR/CN34930000.pdf.
204

205

Id.

206

Id.
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Roncalio Report, supra note 153, at 20.
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This procedural synopsis comes from the report of the gentleman who (setting
aside the Board of Control) would serve as the first special master in the Big Horn
adjudication: former Wyoming Congressman Teno Roncalio. Judge Joffe would
appoint Special Master Roncalio to this position on May 4, 1979, roughly six
months after the tribes had intervened in the adjudication. In turn, a little over
a year after the special master had been appointed, the federal, state, tribal, and
other parties would agree to the three-phase framework mentioned above that
would structure the entire proceeding.
Rooted in the certification provision of the adjudication statute, the State of
Wyoming filed motions in April and August of 1978 to certify various matters
involving water rights and interests in the Wind-Big Horn Basin to the Board
of Control, as the board had lost jurisdiction over these matters upon the
adjudication’s commencement.208 The United States unsuccessfully opposed both
motions, and its grounds harkened back to the jurisdictional disputes. An initial
response requested a denial or stay of the state’s motion pending completion of
discovery on the board’s appointment as special master, querying why the state
was “so unwilling to have an impartial Special Master appointed . . . .”209 A
subsequent response echoed these positions but went further, contending that
appointment of the board would be inappropriate because “no member of [it]
has legal training,” and proposing that the court “appoint a neutral and qualified
Special Master, not the State Board of Control or the State Engineer nor any state
or federal agency . . . .”210 Alternatively, the United States proposed permitting the
board to act on the specific matters addressed in the state’s motions, and revisiting
the propriety of certification afterward.211 Judge Joffe did just this in an order
issued August 22, 1978.212

Motion for Certification to the Board of Control (April 20, 1978), available at http://bhrac.
washakiecounty.net/DocumentCenter/BHCR/WGH52K0000.pdf (noting sixteen applications for
changes in water rights on which board sought to act); Motion for Certification to the Board of
Control (August 14, 1978) available at http://bhrac.washakiecounty.net/DocumentCenter/BHCR/
MOT73O0000.pdf (noting twenty-six requests on which board was unable to act).
208

209
Memorandum in Opposition to the State of Wyoming’s Motion for Certification to the
Board of Control 1–2 (May 10, 1978), available at http://bhrac.washakiecounty.net/Document
Center/BHCR/K4F4WU0000.pdf.

Response of the United States to Motion for Certification of August 11, 1978, at 1, 3 (August
18, 1978), available at http://bhrac.washakiecounty.net/DocumentCenter/BHCR/8AW58E0000.pdf.
210

211

Id. at 3– 4.

First Order of Certification and Referral to Wyoming State Board of Control (August
22, 1978), available at http://bhrac.washakiecounty.net/DocumentCenter/BHCR/1RJJGQ0000.
pdf. The court later amended this order to modify the due date for a report from the board. Order
(December 29, 1978), available at http://bhrac.washakiecounty.net/DocumentCenter/BHCR/
2T2GD00000.pdf.
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Approximately nine months passed between the court’s issuance of its initial
order of certification and referral to the Board of Control in August 1978 and its
subsequent order appointing Special Master Roncalio in May 1979. The latter
emerged after several months of briefing from the parties on the propriety of
the board’s serving as special master. Such an arrangement would not deny due
process to any party due to bias or impartiality argued the state, describing the
board as “admirably equipped, through the training, knowledge, and experience
of its members” to assist the court with the adjudication.213 The United States and
the tribes had a different perspective. Contending that the state’s proprietary and
governmental interests in the litigation made it inappropriate for the board to
serve as special master, the United States moved in February 1979 for appointment
of a “neutral Master” who was “neither a state nor a federal employee” nor had
any “personal interest in the outcome of this litigation.”214 The tribes made a
similar motion at this time, requesting the court to appoint “someone who is an
attorney, with judicial, academic or other experience in federal and state water
law, including reserved rights, and who is not a present or former employee of
the Tribes, or the State of Wyoming.”215 Three suggestions offered by the tribes
fit these criteria: (1) Professor Robert Emmet Clark of the University of Arizona
College of Law; (2) Mr. Teno Roncalio, a former Wyoming Congressman from
1961–1967 and 1971–1978; and (3) Judge Robert Vogel, who previously had
served as a Justice of the North Dakota Supreme Court.216 In a letter dated March
23, 1979, Judge Joffe informed the parties that Teno Roncalio had been selected
and invited objections to this appointment.217 An order appointing the special
master followed on May 4, 1979.218
Less than three weeks elapsed before Special Master Roncalio’s charge was
laid before him. It came in the form of an order of certification and referral

State of Wyoming’s Brief in Support of Its Motion for Certification to the Board of Control
1–2 (February 21, 1979), available at http://bhrac.washakiecounty.net/DocumentCenter/BHCR/
BCS9TE0000.pdf.
213

Motion for Appointment of Master 1 (February 26, 1979), available at http://bhrac.washakie
county.net/DocumentCenter/BHCR/31JZ610000.pdf.
214

Motion of the Shoshone and Arapahoe Tribes for the Appointment of a Neutral Special
Master (February 22, 1979), available at http://bhrac.washakiecounty.net/DocumentCenter/BHCR/
M3VZ7X0000.pdf.
215

The Shoshone and Arapahoe Tribes’ Suggestions for Special Master (March 12, 1979),
available at http://bhrac.washakiecounty.net/DocumentCenter/BHCR/PGINFQ0000.pdf.
216

Letter from Judge Harold Joffe to All Attorneys of Record (March 23, 1979), available at
http://bhrac.washakiecounty.net/DocumentCenter/BHCR/GOIYY70000.pdf.
217

Order Appointing Special Master (May 4, 1979), available at http://bhrac.washakiecounty.
net/DocumentCenter/BHCR/FX4FO60000.pdf [hereinafter Appointment Order]. See also O’Gara,
supra note 14, at 175–76 (describing Special Master Roncalio’s background and appointment).
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whose content closely tracked the adjudication statute and complaint.219 Subject
to eventual review by the district court, it would be the special master’s task
(1) to determine the status of existing water rights evidenced by previously issued
certificates and court decrees as well as (2) to determine the status of all uncancelled
permits to acquire water rights, and to adjudicate any interest or right arising
under these permits.220 Also falling within the special master’s charge was the
obligation to determine “the extent and priority date of and adjudicate any other
interest in or right to use the water of the Big Horn River System within Water
Division No. 3” not otherwise represented by the foregoing certificates, decrees,
and permits, including “any appropriative or reserved rights of the Arapaho Tribe,
Shoshone Tribe, or of the United States . . . .”221 The order imposing this labor
on the special master called for a report to be submitted by January 1, 1982,
containing a tabulation or list of the water rights just noted.222 As an immediate
milestone in this process, the court ordered the parties’ first meeting to take place
roughly three months later.223
The trial before Special Master Roncalio in the Big Horn adjudication
would not begin until January 1981—approximately a year and a half after the
special master’s appointment—and it was in conjunction with a host of pretrial
matters addressed during this interim period that the parties would develop
the adjudication’s procedural framework.224 Among other notable matters that
emerged at this stage were pleadings and briefing regarding the precise boundaries
of the federal lands located within the Wind-Big Horn Basin, including the Wind
River Indian Reservation. The major parties entered into a series of stipulations
to resolve these boundary issues.225 Added to these stipulations was another forged
on June 23, 1980, that “cleared the decks for launching the trial upon the claims
of the United States, as trustee for the Tribes,” after a roughly nine-month time lag
due to discovery.226 This stipulation provided, in relevant part, that “[n]either the
United States nor the Tribes [would] raise objections to provisional confirmation
of adjudicated rights until after the reserved rights and any of the water rights

First Order of Certification and Referral to Master Teno Roncalio and Setting of First
Meeting of the Parties (May 22, 1979), available at http://bhrac.washakiecounty.net/Document
Center/BHCR/X87VPG0000.pdf [hereinafter Certification and Referral Order]. The date noted
in this order for the parties’ first meeting was changed from August 6 to 7 in an order issued one
week later.
219
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Id. at 1–2.
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Id. at 1–2.
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Id. at 2.

223

Id.
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Roncalio Report, supra note 153, at 21–24.

Id. at 21–22. Special Master Roncalio included the stipulation regarding the boundaries of
the Wind River Indian Reservation as appendix one of his report. Id. at 349–63.
225
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Id. at 26 n.23, 27.
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under Federal law of the United States and the Tribes [have] been determined
by the Master and District Court.”227 Founded on this stipulation, the Big Horn
adjudication would proceed in three phases over the next four decades: (1) Phase
I addressing the reserved right held by the tribes and derivative water rights held
by Indian and non-Indian parties, (2) Phase II concerning reserved rights held
by the federal government for federal lands other than the Wind River Indian
Reservation, and (3) Phase III evaluating appropriative rights rooted in state law.

B. Phase I: Indian Reserved Right and Walton Rights
Over the course of a roughly fourteen-year period extending from February
1988 to June 2002, the Wyoming Supreme Court issued five opinions and one
substantive order, and the U.S. Supreme Court released one per curiam decision,
to address the diverse legal issues presented in the Big Horn adjudication regarding
the existence, nature, and scope of the reserved right held by the Eastern Shoshone
and Northern Arapaho tribes, as well as derivative water rights held by Indian
and non-Indian parties. This legal corpus from the two law-announcing courts
framed Phase I of the adjudication. It was underpinned by a host of decrees and
judgments from the district court judges, and reports from the special masters,
who invested considerable hours and pages into addressing the water rights at
issue in this stage of the proceeding. The survey of this phase that appears below
begins with a case dubbed its “headwaters,” Big Horn I, as affirmed by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Wyoming v. United States, and then progresses through four
other cases and one order, Big Horn II-VI, collectively labeled its “tributaries.”
These appellate decisions structure the narrative in order to streamline it. Brief
references and citations to the district judges’ and special masters’ underlying
rulings are also included.

1. Headwaters
a. Big Horn I: Reserved Right and Walton Rights
Released by the Wyoming Supreme Court on February 24, 1988, Big Horn I
articulated in what proved to be a long-lasting manner the existence, nature, and
scope of the reserved right held by the Eastern Shoshone and Northern Arapaho
Tribes, as well as derivative water rights held by Indian and non-Indian parties
stemming from their ownership of lands in the diminished and ceded portions
of the Wind River Indian Reservation.228 Big Horn I constituted the headwaters
227

Id. at 25–26 (emphasis added).

For an overview of Big Horn I from the tribes’ Supreme Court advocate Susan Williams, see
Williams, supra note 9, at 170–72. Other useful discussions of Big Horn I include Walter Rusinek,
A Preview of Coming Attractions? Wyoming v. United States and the Reserved Rights Doctrine, 17
Ecology L.Q. 355, 382–92 (1990); Lynnette J. Boomgarden, Note, Quantification of Federal
Reserved Indian Water Rights—“Practicably Irrigable Acreage” Under Fire: The Search for a Better
Legal Standard, 25 Land & Water L. Rev. 417, 423–24 (1990).
228
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of Phase I in that its holdings in these respects served as precedents from which
later cases—namely, Big Horn II-VI—would branch off during the next decade
and a half.
Treating as a front bookend Special Master Roncalio’s Phase I trial begun
on January 26, 1981, judicial officials proceeded to invest more than seven years
into the parties’ competing claims regarding the tribes’ reserved right, and various
parties’ derivative water rights, before the Wyoming Supreme Court released Big
Horn I.229 In a nutshell, prior to the case’s arriving at the higher court, Special
Master Roncalio had offered his conclusions concerning these claims in two
reports issued in December 1982 and June 1984,230 Judge Joffe had issued his
decision pertaining to the special master’s first report in May 1983,231 and Judge
Johnson had entered an amended judgment and decree and an order disposing
of these claims in May 1985.232 Settlement negotiations involving federal, state,
and tribal officials, as well as attorneys for private parties, likewise had taken place
between June 1984 and February 1986, eventually coming to a halt pending the
Wyoming Supreme Court’s decision in Big Horn I.233 It was from Judge Johnson’s
rulings that the Big Horn I appeal was taken. These rulings generally concerned
the core issues of whether the tribes held a reserved right, what attributes that

229
A transcript of the first day of the Phase I trial can be found at http://bhrac.washakiecounty.
net/DocumentCenter/BHCR/O5W4SS0000.pdf. See also O’Gara, supra note 14, at 177–82
(describing certain aspects of Phase I trial before Special Master Roncalio).

Roncalio Report, supra note 153; Teno Roncalio, Special Master, Supplemental and Final
Report (June 1, 1984), available at http://bhrac.washakiecounty.net/DocumentCenter/BHCR/4-12014o.PDF.
230

Harold Joffe, District Judge, Decision Concerning Reserved Water Right Claims by and
on Behalf of the Tribes of the Wind River Indian Reservation, Wyoming (May 10, 1983), available
at http://bhrac.washakiecounty.net/DocumentCenter/BHCR/JoffeDec05101983.pdf. See also
O’Gara, supra note 14, at 182–85 (describing proceedings before Judge Joffe during his review of
Special Master Roncalio’s report).
231

232
Amended Judgment and Decree (May 15, 1985), available at http://bhrac.washakiecounty.
net/DocumentCenter/BHCR/11112t.pdf; Order Denying Treaty Priority Date, Modifying and
Correcting Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Ruling on Certain Specified Claims, and
Deferring Acceptance of Recommended Final Decree in the Special Master’s Supplemental and
Final Report (May 15, 1985), available at http://bhrac.washakiecounty.net/DocumentCenter/
BHCR/Y3V88V0000.pdf.

S. Jane Caton, Assistant Attorney General, Wyoming Attorney General’s Office, Report
to the Governor and Wyoming State Legislature: Big Horn River General Adjudication Progress
and Current Status 5–7, 14 (1987) (on file with author). According to Ms. Caton, the settlement
proposals generally were structured to “allow the Tribes to develop part of their reserved water rights
now, defer other parts[,] and receive benefits in return for this deferral.” Id. at 13–14. Apparently
a major purpose of the settlement negotiations was “to identify water development projects that
might be of mutual benefit to Indian and non-Indian residents of the Basin.” Id. at 14. See also
Randall T. Cox, Assistant Attorney General, State of Wyoming, Summary of Big Horn River System
Adjudication 5 (1984) (describing settlement negotiations and proposals in similar terms) (on file
with author).
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right bore if it existed, and to what extent individual parties held derivative water
rights. The Wyoming Supreme Court structured the Big Horn I opinion in a
linear manner around these issues, and the discussion below is similarly organized
to provide an overview of the court’s holdings.234
Existence of Reserved Right. “Is there a reserved water right for the Wind
River Indian Reservation?” The Wyoming Supreme Court posed this question
as a heading at the outset of its analysis and proceeded to offer an affirmative
answer to it. “The treaty establishing the Wind River Indian Reservation . . .
is silent on the subject of water for the reservation,” described the court, “[y]et
both the district court and the special master found an intent to reserve water.
We affirm.”235 Initially referencing the diligent work performed by Special Master
Roncalio, Judge Joffe, and Judge Johnson on this threshold matter, the court
primarily invested its remarks into refuting various arguments asserted by the
state for not recognizing a reserved right for the reservation. Neither the equal
footing clause of Wyoming’s Act of Admission, nor the water-related provisions
of Article 8 of the Wyoming Constitution, evidenced “an intent by Congress not
to reserve water for the reservation,” concluded the court.236 The same could be
said with respect to the Second McLaughlin Agreement.237 On these bases and
others, the court was not dissuaded from holding, as had the special master and
the district court judges, that the Second Treaty of Fort Bridger implicitly reserved
water for the Wind River Indian Reservation.
Purposes of Reservation. But for what purposes exactly had the Wind River
Indian Reservation been established? The justices turned next to this question.
It was paramount given its bearing on quantification of the reserved right.238 Yet
it was perhaps slightly more vexing than the threshold question had been in that
Special Master Roncalio had answered it one way (a permanent homeland),239
while both district court judges had answered it another (agriculture alone).240
234
In re the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System
and All Other Sources, 753 P.2d 76 (Wyo. 1988) (Big Horn I ). Before addressing these issues on the
merits, the court rejected the argument that had been raised earlier regarding the disclaimer clause
in Article 21, Section 26 of the Wyoming Constitution precluding state court jurisdiction over the
adjudication. Id. at 86–88.
235

Id. at 91.

236

Id. at 92.

Id. See also id. at 93 (rejecting argument that United States’ acquisition of state water
permits for Indian land after 1905 evidenced congressional intent not to reserve water for tribes).
237

Id. at 94 (“[T]he amount of water impliedly reserved is determined by the purposes for
which the reservation was created.”).
238

As construed by Special Master Roncalio, the principle purpose of the treaty was “to
provide the Indians with a homeland where they could establish a permanent place to live and to
develop their civilization just as any other nation throughout history has been able to develop its
civilization.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).
239

240

Id. at 95 (“‘On the very face of the Treaty, it is clear that its purpose was purely agricultural.’”).
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A similar 3-2 split occurred on the court. “Considering the well-established
principles of treaty interpretation, the treaty itself, the ample evidence and
testimony addressed, and the findings of the district court,” explained the threejustice majority, “we have no difficulty affirming the finding that it was the intent
at the time to create a reservation with a sole agricultural purpose.”241 Notably,
although the majority used the term “sole” in this quotation of its holding, the
term “primary” appears elsewhere in the opinion—e.g., “the treaty encouraged
only agriculture, and that was its primary purpose,” and “the primary activity
was clearly agricultural.”242 As discussed in the next section, the U.S. Supreme
Court had attached legal significance to the term “primary” a decade earlier in
its landmark decision U.S. v. New Mexico addressing quantification of federal
reserved rights.243 While acknowledging the questionable applicability of this
term to Indian reserved rights, the majority in Big Horn I nonetheless used it in
the foregoing places.244 Ultimately construing the treaty as reflecting a singular
agricultural purpose, the majority held that the reserved right extended to water
for agricultural, commercial, domestic, livestock, and municipal uses, but not
for fisheries, industrial and mineral development, or wildlife and aesthetics.245 In
contrast, two dissenting justices would have followed Special Master Roncalio’s
lead, holding that Congress’s purpose in establishing the reservation had been to
create a tribal homeland, and that the reserved right encompassed any water use
considered appropriate to that homeland as it progressed and developed.246
Groundwater and Exports. Having recognized the existence of the reserved
right based on the Second Treaty of Fort Bridger, and having construed the
treaty’s purpose as just described vis-à-vis the quantity of the right, the court
then addressed two related issues before turning to quantification. An initial issue
concerned groundwater. Did the reserved right attach to it? “The logic which
supports a reservation of surface water to fulfill the purpose of the reservation
also supports reservation of groundwater. . . . Certainly the two sources are often

Id. at 96 (emphasis added). In reaching its holding, the court relied in part on the U.S.
Supreme Court’s construction of the treaty fifty years earlier in United States v. Shoshone Tribe of
Indians, 304 U.S. 111, 117–18 (1938) (describing how various treaty provisions “plainly evidence
purpose on the part of the United States to help to create an independent permanent farming
community upon the reservation.”).
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Big Horn I, 753 P.2d at 97–98.
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United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 700–702 (1978).

244

Big Horn I, 753 P.2d at 96.

245

Id. at 98–99.

Id. at 119 (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 135 (Hanscum, J., dissenting). Although in
accord with regard to the homeland purpose of the reservation, the dissenting justices disagreed
about whether exportation of water by the tribes comported with this purpose. Justice Hanscum
would have taken that “additional step” given the proper circumstances, whereas Justice Thomas
was unwilling to assume that “using the reserved water as a salable commodity was contemplated in
connection with the implied reservation of the water.” Id. at 119, 135.
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interconnected.”247 This statement by the court seemed to settle the matter at
first blush, but not so. Notwithstanding its decision in Cappaert twelve years
earlier,248 the U.S. Supreme Court had not (and has not since) squarely ruled on
this issue, such that the Wyoming Supreme Court elected to come out the other
way. It ultimately held that the reserved right did not extend to groundwater.249 A
subsequent issue to which the court turned involved exportation—i.e., whether
the tribes could sell or lease water afforded by their reserved right, including for
export off the reservation. In this vein, the court left intact the district court’s
holding that on-reservation sales and leases were permissible, but it did not weigh
in on exports. Apparently the tribes had not sought permission to export, and the
United States had conceded no federal law permitted it.250
Quantification of Reserved Right. Quantification of the tribes’ reserved
right was the next matter at hand. The court initially waded into this issue by
affirming the practicably irrigable acreage (again, PIA) standard as the proper
method for quantification. In line with Arizona v. California, which the special
master and district court judges had followed, the scope of the reserved right
under this standard was based upon “the amount of water necessary to irrigate
all of the reservation’s practicably irrigable acreage.”251 This acreage involved two
types of lands on the Wind River Indian Reservation: (1) future lands (lands “not
yet developed for irrigation, but which were [asserted as] practicably irrigable
acreage”),252 and (2) historic lands (“practicably irrigable acres currently and/
or historically irrigated on the reservation”).253 The court closely reviewed the
arability, engineering feasibility, and economic feasibility analyses that had
been undertaken for both types of lands. It generally upheld these analyses and

247

Id. at 99.

Id. The Ninth Circuit had indicated in Cappaert that the federal reserved right at issue in
that case for Devil’s Hole National Monument attached to groundwater. United States v. Cappaert,
508 F.2d 313, 317 (9th Cir. 1974). Although the U.S. Supreme Court subsequently upheld the
Ninth Circuit’s holding regarding the existence of the reserved right, it expressly noted that it
considered the water to which that right attached to be surface water. Cappaert v. United States,
426 U.S. 128, 142 (1976) (“No cases of this Court have applied the doctrine of implied reservation
of water rights to groundwater. . . . Here, however, the water in the pool is surface water.”).
248

Big Horn I, 753 P.2d at 100. The state did not appeal a ruling in the amended judgment
and decree issued by Judge Johnson on May 15, 1985, that the tribes were entitled to continue
then-existing amounts of groundwater use. Id. Roughly a decade after Big Horn I, the tribes engaged
in settlement conferences with the United States and the state to resolve the tribes’ groundwater
rights—specifically, those associated with pre-May 15, 1985 wells—eventually entering into a
stipulation with these parties that the court subsequently approved in a consent decree in 2001.
Consent Decree Related to Pre-May 15, 1985 Groundwater Uses (December 3, 2001), available at
http://bhrac.washakiecounty.net/DocumentCenter/BHCR/YFAYZ50000.pdf.
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Big Horn I, 753 P.2d at 100.
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Id. at 101.
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concluded as follows: (1) 107,976 acres of practicably irrigable acreage existed
on the reservation (54,216 acres of historic lands, 53,760 acres of future lands),
and (2) a 499,862 acre-feet reserved right (290,490 acre-feet for historic lands,
209,372 acre-feet for future lands) was appropriate based upon this PIA.254
Stemming from U.S. v. New Mexico, which again is discussed below, the court
rejected arguments that the reserved right award, as quantified in this manner,
violated the “sensitivity doctrine”—i.e., that the award had been made without
sufficient “sensitivity to its impact upon those who [had] obtained water rights
under state law . . . .”255 The court expressed uncertainty about whether this
doctrine indeed applied to the reserved right’s quantification,256 and it ultimately
held no violation had occurred even assuming the doctrine were applicable.257
Priority Date and Walton Rights. The reserved right’s priority date was a final
feature touched on by the court, and it was here that the justices addressed a
subject that proved to be as critical as it was contentious as Phase I progressed—
the relationship between the tribes’ reserved right and derivative water rights
of Indian and non-Indian parties. The court began by confirming that the
tribes’ lands on the diminished portion of the Wind River Indian Reservation
carried a reserved right with a priority date of July 3, 1868.258 How, if at all,
did the historical allotment of the reservation affect this priority date for Indian
allottees and their successors? With respect to Indian allottees, the court held
that allotment did not affect the priority date at all, as the Supreme Court had
stated in Powers no evidence existed that “Congress intended allottees be denied
participation in the use of reserved water rights.”259 A similar but not identical
situation existed for non-Indian successors. Hibner had foreshadowed the modern
rule a half-century prior,260 and a trio of Ninth Circuit decisions from the early

These figures are drawn from the court’s analysis in id. at 101–11. One notable way in
which the court did find fault with Special Master Roncalio’s analysis concerned his 10% reduction
of the reserved right award for future lands based upon a margin of error in the arable land base. Id.
at 105. One acre-foot equals 325,851 gallons or 1,233 cubic meters. U.S. Geological Survey, Water
Science Glossary of Terms, http://water.usgs.gov/edu/dictionary.html (last visited March 17, 2015).
254

255
Big Horn I, 753 P.2d at 111 (quoting United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 718
(Powell, J., dissenting)).
256
Id. (“It is thus not clear whether the sensitivity doctrine, requiring the quantification of reserved water rights with sensitivity to the impact on state and private appropriators,
applies here.”).
257
Id. at 112. Earlier in its opinion, the court similarly rejected an argument that the sensitivity
doctrine applied to the issue of congressional intent to reserve water, and also described that the
special master and district court had been sufficiently sensitive to existing water rights even if the
doctrine did apply. Id. at 94.

See id. at 112 (noting priority date generally as 1868). As mentioned previously, July 3,
1868, was the date on which the Second Treaty of Fort Bridger was executed. Id. at 91.
258

259

Id. at 112 (quoting United States v. Powers, 305 U.S. 527, 533 (1939)).

260

United States v. Hibner, 27 F.2d 909, 912 (E.D. Idaho 1928).
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1980s had emerged since this time.261 The cornerstone of this trio was Colville,
and it was from this case that the term “Walton rights” originated to refer to water
rights held by non-Indian successors—Walton was the non-Indian successor’s
name. Colville’s specific holding was that reserved rights held by allottees—i.e.,
pro rata shares of these rights extending from tribes’ reserved rights—passed to
non-Indian successors. These rights carried the reserved right priority date and
afforded a non-Indian successor a “ratable share” of the reserved right based upon
the proportion of irrigable acreage owned by the non-Indian successor within
the reservation.262 This ratable share marked the outer limit of a non-Indian
successor’s water right. The precise quantity of use permitted depended upon
(1) the amount of water being appropriated by the Indian allottee at the passage
of title plus (2) any additional water appropriated by a non-Indian successor with
“reasonable diligence” after this time.263 The Wyoming Supreme Court adhered
to the Ninth Circuit’s approach in Colville and instructed that the non-Indian
successors who had appealed in Big Horn I should be awarded water rights on
remand in accordance with the foregoing rule.264 After addressing the water rights
of Indian allottees and their successors, the court further held that the 1868
priority date extended to reacquired lands in the ceded and diminished portions
of the reservation.265
Monitoring. Only one issue remained for the court to address following its
pronouncements regarding the existence, nature, and scope of the tribes’ reserved
right and derivative water rights. Did the State Engineer possess authority to
monitor the tribes’ reserved right as embodied in the district court’s decree?
The court held in the affirmative and took pains to distinguish “monitoring”
from “administration” when explicating its holding.266 It clarified that the State
Engineer’s role was not to apply state water law on the Wind River Indian
Reservation, but rather to enforce the reserved right as decreed “under principles
of federal law.”267 Further, the court explained that, if the State Engineer were
to find the tribes had violated the decree, he or she would be obligated to “turn
to the courts” for its enforcement and not “simply close the headgates.”268 On
Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1981). The Ninth Circuit
requested the U.S. Supreme Court to review its treatment of non-Indian successors’ water rights in
Colville, but on two occasions the Court denied certiorari. Big Horn I, 753 P.2d at 113. The other
Ninth Circuit cases in this trio were United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1984), and
United States v. Anderson, 736 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1984).
261
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Colville, 647 F.2d at 51.

263

Id.

264

Big Horn I, 753 P.2d at 113.
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Id. at 114.

Id. at 115 (describing how State Engineer’s “[i]ncidental monitoring of Indian use” under
decree had “carelessly been termed ‘administration’ of Indian water”).
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the other hand, although describing that “state water appropriators [were] not
in a position to jeopardize the decreed rights of the Tribes,” the court stated
that if such conflicts were to arise “the United States and the Tribes [must] first
turn to the state engineer to exercise his authority over the state users to protect
their reserved water rights before they seek court assistance.”269 In the justices’
view, Article 1, Section 31 of the Wyoming Constitution dispelled any fears that
the State Engineer might execute this duty in an unfair manner. This provision
obligated the state to “equally guard all of the various interests involved” when
providing for water use,270 and the State Engineer had sworn to uphold it.271

b. Wyoming v. United States
Following the Wyoming Supreme Court’s decision and a subsequent denial of
rehearing, Big Horn I eventually made its way to the U.S. Supreme Court.272 The
State of Wyoming filed a petition for certiorari on August 18, 1988,273 and the
Eastern Shoshone and Northern Arapaho tribes, as well as the City of Riverton,
filed cross-petitions.274 Only the State of Wyoming’s petition ultimately would be
granted.275 It posed three questions. An initial query concerned the existence of
a reserved right for the Wind River Indian Reservation: “Can a Federal reserved
water right impliedly exist for the Reservation despite an express Congressional
requirement that the Reservation’s water rights be obtained under state law?”276

269

Id.

270

Wyo. Const. art. I, § 31.

271

Big Horn I, 753 P.2d at 115.

272
Special Master Roncalio prepared an insightful piece on Wyoming v. United States several
years after the U.S. Supreme Court issued its per curiam decision. Teno Roncalio, The Big Horns of
a Dilemma, in Indian Water in the New West 209–14 (Thomas R. McGuire et al. eds., 1993).
For other useful discussions of Wyoming v. United States, see Rusinek, supra note 228, at 394–404;
Boomgarden, supra note 228, at 424–25.
273
1988 WL 1094117 (U.S.) [hereinafter Wyoming Petition]. As described several years later
by Special Master Roncalio, “[n]ine western states, and a host of other water entities, filed amicus
briefs supporting the Wyoming effort, a cause celebre to many water users in the West.” Roncalio,
supra note 272, at 209. See also Rusinek, supra note 228, at 397–98 (discussing positions of amici
supporting and opposing Wyoming).

As described by the tribes’ Supreme Court advocate Susan Williams, “the tribes had decided
not to appeal because the award of water [in Big Horn I ] was so large and some language from the
special master indicated that the tribe could use that award for other uses within the reservation.”
Williams, supra note 9, at 171. The tribes’ decision to file a cross-petition apparently stemmed from
concerns that “the Supreme Court would alter the PIA standard.” Id. According to Ms. Williams,
the tribes’ cross-petition focused on the “restriction on groundwater” imposed in Big Horn I and the
tribes’ authority to “transfer use of water on the reservation.” Id. See also Rusinek, supra note 228, at
394 (listing six issues for which tribes sought review in cross-petition).
274

275
The Court denied the tribes’ and City of Riverton’s petitions on July 3, 1989. 492 U.S.
926 (1989).
276

Wyoming Petition, supra note 273, at 1.
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Following this query was a second question regarding the PIA standard:
In the absence of any demonstrated necessity for additional
water to fulfill reservation purposes[,] and in the presence of
substantial state water rights long in use on the Reservation,
may a reserved water right be implied for all practicably irrigable
lands within a Reservation set aside for a specific tribe?277
Complementing these inquiries was a third concerning the reserved right’s
priority date: “What priority date should be accorded a reserved water right, if
any, for practicably irrigable lands which were ceded by the Reservation’s Tribes,
if those lands later were restored to and made a part of the reservation by the
United States or were reacquired by Indians from non-Indians?”278 Granting the
state’s petition roughly five months after it had been filed, the Court limited its
review to the second question noted here.279 It was the Wyoming Supreme Court’s
quantification of the tribes’ reserved right under the PIA standard that would be
the focus of the U.S. Supreme Court’s review.280
Oral argument took place on the state’s PIA-related question on April
25, 1989, and readily apparent from the transcript is the fact that the Court’s
decision had the potential to shape the reserved rights doctrine profoundly.281
Several colloquies between the Justices and advocates addressed the Court’s initial
adoption of the PIA standard in Arizona v. California and its persistence within the
Court’s jurisprudence. Should the Court retain or discard the PIA standard?282 To
what extent, if any, did it require an assessment of “whether additional irrigation

277

Id.

278

Id. at 2.

279

The Court’s order granting certiorari can be found at 488 U.S. 1040 (1989).

See also Wyoming Petition, supra note 273, at 11 (“The appropriate quantification standard
for reserved water rights of an agricultural Indian reservation is an important question of federal
law which has not been, but should be, settled by this Court.”); Roncalio, supra note 272, at 211
(offering Special Master Roncalio’s perspective that the PIA standard “was precisely what was under
attack in Wyoming’s 1989 appeal to the Supreme Court,” and describing that he had also “faced
this reality when appointed special master to the Big Horn case in 1979” and ultimately “could see
no difference” in the standard’s application to the Wind River Indian Reservation versus the Indian
reservations to which the U.S. Supreme Court had applied the standard in Arizona v. California).
Potential reasons for the Court’s granting certiorari are discussed in Boomgarden, supra note 228,
at 428.
280

281
Supreme Court Transcript, supra note 6. The transcript itself does not identify the Justices
by name in relation to their respective questions and remarks. For an engaging narrative of the oral
argument in which the individual Justices are identified, see O’Gara, supra note 14, at 190–92.
282
Supreme Court Transcript, supra note 6, at 14 (quoting colloquy in which unidentified
Justice described Arizona v. California as containing “virtually no reasoning” and expressed
skepticism about considering the special master’s discussion of the PIA standard in Arizona v.
California as later referenced in the Court’s opinion).
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projects are reasonably likely to be constructed” in the future? 283 Other colloquies
concerned the PIA standard’s application to the Wind River Indian Reservation.
Would the Court’s adherence to the standard in the case entail fidelity or disloyalty
to Congress’s intent in 1868?284 Yet other colloquies focused on attributes of Indian
reserved rights that do not appear to have implicated the PIA standard directly—
particularly, the distinction between reserved rights and appropriative rights in
terms of the former not being lost by non-use.285 And, finally, looming across all
of these critical topics was a foundational matter emphasized by the Justices at
least twice during the argument: the implicit and judicial nature of the reserved
rights doctrine. In the words of one Justice not identified in the transcript: “The
whole Winters doctrine is just an implication to Congress. Congress never said
in so many words, we’re reserving a water right. That’s just what this Court said
Congress must have intended. So, Congress has never spoken.”286
A draft opinion prepared by Justice O’Connor and circulated among her
colleagues approximately six weeks after oral argument in Wyoming v. United
States further demonstrated how the Court’s forthcoming decision potentially
could work monumental changes in the reserved rights doctrine—in particular,
per the question presented, the PIA standard.287 Expressing agreement with
the State of Wyoming’s argument that “quantification of Indian reserved rights
must entail sensitivity to the impact on state and private appropriators of scarce
water under state law,” the draft opinion suggested that such sensitivity should
inform the PIA determination.288 A degree of pragmatism was called for in this

Id. at 10. See also id. (“Does one have to take into the calculus whether any of these projects
to make [acreage] irrigable will be constructed?”).
283

See id. at 15 (containing remark by unidentified Justice expressing difficulty with believing
that “in 1868 Congress, no matter what the size of the Indian population that was contemplated to
be on the [reservation], should be deemed to have said we’re giving enough water to irrigate every
inch of arable land.”).
284

285
See id. at 16 (quoting colloquy in which unidentified Justice expressed concern reserved
rights would not be subject to diminution for non-use, and described that “doesn’t have to be” in
“the very nature of a reserved water right . . . . [T]here is no doctrine of water law that elevates one
right over another to that extent.”).
286
Id. at 16. See also id. at 18 (quoting exchange between unidentified Justice and tribes’
Supreme Court advocate Susan Williams in which Ms. Williams responded affirmatively to question
posed by Justice that “the Winters doctrine was just an intent that this Court attributed to Congress,
wasn’t it? Congress didn’t say in so many words, in the reservations we’re setting aside water.”).

A copy of Justice O’Connor’s draft opinion is attached as an appendix to Andrew C.
Mergen & Sylvia F. Liu, A Misplaced Sensitivity: The Draft Opinions in Wyoming v. United States,
68 U. Colo. L. Rev. 683, 725–60 (1997) [hereinafter Draft Opinion]. Justice Brennan prepared a
lengthy draft dissent. Id. at 741–60.
287

288
Id. at 737. See also Williams, supra note 9, at 171 (providing description from tribes’
Supreme Court advocate Susan Williams that “there was a lot of concern” among the Justices at oral
argument about the impact of the tribes’ reserved right on “non-Indians who had been using water,”
and that some Justices “indicated concern with the sensitivity doctrine.”).
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regard—pragmatism that would entail integrating into PIA analysis a “practical
assessment—a determination apart from theoretical economic and engineering
feasibility—of the reasonable likelihood that future irrigation projects, necessary
to enable lands which have never been irrigated to obtain water, will actually be
built.”289 Beyond integrating this sensitivity doctrine into PIA analysis, the draft
opinion also highlighted two unresolved issues involving key features of Indian
reserved rights. The first issue was “whether such rights are subject to forfeiture
for nonuse”—a topic broached at oral argument as noted above—and the second
issue was “whether they may be sold or leased for use on or off the reservation”
(i.e., after being quantified under the PIA standard).290
Neither the sensitivity doctrine’s role, if any, within PIA analysis, nor the
two associated issues regarding the attributes of Indian reserved rights ultimately
would be addressed by the Court in its final decision in Wyoming v. United States.
Justice O’Connor recused herself from the case shortly after circulating the draft
opinion,291 and the remaining Justices split 4-4 on the PIA question, affirming
the Wyoming Supreme Court’s decision on June 26, 1989, as an equally divided
Court.292 This one-line per curiam decision brought Big Horn I to a close. It
made Big Horn I the first proceeding in which Indian reserved rights had been
quantified since Arizona v. California twenty-six years earlier,293 but in and of itself
carried no precedential weight.294

2. Tributaries
a. Big Horn III: Reserved Right—Use and Administration
Less than two years passed after the U.S. Supreme Court’s affirmance of Big
Horn I before the parties were back in the Wyoming Supreme Court disputing
critical issues involving the tribes’ reserved right. Big Horn III was the case in
289
Draft Opinion, supra note 287, at 738 (emphasis in original). “Imagine the spawning of
litigation [this] language would have generated,” described the tribes’ Supreme Court advocate
Susan Williams two decades later upon the Winters centennial—“[t]hankfully it was not ever
issued.” Williams, supra note 9, at 172.
290

Draft Opinion, supra note 287, at 734.

Justice O’Connor decided to recuse herself after learning that her family’s ranching
corporation—of which she was a minority stockholder—had been named a party in the State of
Arizona’s still-ongoing Gila River adjudication involving various Indian reserved rights claims.
Mergen & Liu, supra note 287, at 684–85.
291

Wyoming v. United States, 492 U.S. 406 (1989). For an insightful discussion of challenging
legal issues that, in Special Master Roncalio’s view, would have arisen if the U.S. Supreme Court had
reversed Big Horn I in Wyoming v. United States, see Roncalio, supra note 272, at 212–13.
292

293
Boomgarden, supra note 228, at 426 (citing David H. Getches, Foreword, in American
Indian Resources Institute, Tribal Water Management Handbook xv (1988)).

See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 192 (1972) (“Nor is an affirmance by an equally divided
Court entitled to precedential weight.”).
294
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which these issues came to a head.295 It was preceded by a Walton rights-related
decision, Big Horn II, by roughly a year and a half. Given that decision’s distinct
focus, however, it is covered below alongside its counterparts.
Big Horn III ’s backstory traces to efforts by the tribes after Big Horn I
to dedicate a portion of their reserved right—specifically, its future lands
component—to instream flows for tribal fisheries and related non-consumptive
uses along the Wind River.296 The tribes undertook a number of measures to this
end, adopting a tribal water code, creating a water resources control board, and
subsequently issuing a tribal instream flow permit in April 1990 that dedicated a
prescribed amount of water from the Wind River for instream flow purposes.297
These purposes included fisheries restoration and enhancement, recreational uses,
and groundwater recharge by downstream irrigators and other water users.298
Shortly after issuing this permit, the tribes submitted a complaint to the State
Engineer about the impact of water diversions by appropriators with state
law-based water rights on flow levels in the Wind River.299 The tribes asserted
that these levels had dropped below the specified flow volumes secured by their
permit.300 In response to this complaint, the State Engineer determined that
the tribes’ permit was unenforceable because their reserved right only extended
to diversions of water, and that any change in the use of water afforded by the
right had to be made following a diversion.301 When the tribes later requested
curtailment of appropriative rights held by Midvale Irrigation District, the State
Engineer refused to honor this request on the ground that it was unlawful.302
Litigation then ensued before Special Master Dolan and Judge Hartman, both of
whom rendered decisions in the tribes’ favor.303 These decisions rested on several
295
In re the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System
and All Other Sources, 835 P.2d 273 (Wyo. 1992) (Big Horn III ). An excellent discussion of Big
Horn III ’s milestones can be found in O’Gara, supra note 14, at 232–44. For additional useful
scholarship, see Wes Williams, Jr., Note, Changing Water Use for Federally Reserved Indian Water
Rights: Wind River Indian Reservation, 27 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 501 (1994); Peggy Sue Kirk, Note,
Cowboys, Indians and Reserved Water Rights: May a State Court Limit How Indian Tribes Use Their
Water?, 28 Land & Water L. Rev. 467 (1993); Berrie Martinis, Note, From Quantification to
Qualification: A State Court’s Distortion of the Law in In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use
Water in the Big Horn River System, 68 Wash. L. Rev. 435 (1993); Mark Squillace, Transferring
Indian Reserved Rights to Instream Flows: Lessons from the Big Horn Adjudication, 4 Rivers 48 (1993).
296

Big Horn III, 835 P.2d at 275.
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Id. at 275–76.
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Id. at 276.

299

Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Judgment and Decree 17–19 (March 11, 1991), available at http://bhrac.washakiecounty.
net/DocumentCenter/BHCR/GQVXO70000.pdf; Report and Recommendation of the Special
Master 19–20 (October 4, 1990), available at http://bhrac.washakiecounty.net/DocumentCenter/
BHCR/U80LAK0000.pdf.
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precedents, but especially noteworthy among them was a 1979 decree issued by
the U.S. Supreme Court in Arizona v. California.304 This decree declared that the
PIA standard, as applied to quantify the water rights of the five Indian reservations
at issue in that case, “shall constitute the means of determining [the] quantity
of adjudicated water rights but shall not constitute a restriction of the usage of
them to irrigation or other agricultural application.”305 As will be seen shortly,
notwithstanding this text from the Court’s decree, the Wyoming Supreme Court
charted a different course in Big Horn III.
The issues in Big Horn III were thus twofold: (1) whether the tribes were
authorized to use a portion of their reserved right, as established and quantified
under the PIA standard in Big Horn I, for instream flows, and (2) whether the
State Engineer should administer all water rights on the Wind River Indian
Reservation (i.e., state law-based appropriative rights as well as the tribes’ reserved
right and derivative water rights based on federal law). The Wyoming Supreme
Court resolved these issues in a “fractured” decision consisting of separate opinions
from each justice.306 A useful roadmap for these opinions appears in Justice
Golden’s dissent.307
Use of Reserved Water. Turning initially to the issue of instream flows, Justice
Macy wrote a majority opinion in which Justices Thomas and Cardine joined
in separate concurrences. As an overview, the respective views of these justices
were as follows. Justice Macy considered Big Horn I controlling in this realm,
construing it as stating “clearly and unequivocally” that “the Tribes had the right
to use a quantified amount of water on their reservation solely for agricultural
and subsumed purposes and not for instream purposes.”308 Justice Macy further
concluded that (1) the tribes were required to comply with state law when seeking
a change in use from agricultural to instream flow purposes, but (2) the tribes

304

Arizona v. California, 439 U.S. 419 (1979).

Id. at 422 (emphasis added). The Court’s decree further provided that if the reserved rights
were used for purposes other than “irrigation or other agricultural application, the total consumptive
use for [each] Reservation shall not exceed the consumptive use that would have resulted if the
diversions . . . had been used for irrigation of the number of acres specified for that Reservation . . .
and for the satisfaction of related uses.” Id. at 422–23.
305

Craig Alexander, Results Following Litigation: The Wind River Tribes/Big Horn River, in The
Future of Indian and Federal Reserved Water Rights: The Winters Centennial 177 (Barbara
Cosens and Judith V. Royster eds., 2012) (referencing Big Horn III as a “fractured opinion” that “left
the parties with no guidance and guaranteed continued litigation,” and describing “Big Horn’s use of
the PIA standard” as a “restriction on use” as contrary to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1979 decree in
Arizona v. California). See also John C. Schumacher, Wind River Litigation: Decades in the Making
15 (2012) (“The Wyoming Supreme Court’s ruling in Big Horn III has something for everyone and
nothing for anyone. . . . Its value as precedent is limited.”) (on file with author).
306

307
In re the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System
and All Other Sources, 835 P.2d 273, 300–303 (Wyo. 1992) (Big Horn III ).
308

Id. at 278 (emphasis added).
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were legally incapable of doing so because only the state could hold instream
flow rights under Wyoming law.309 Justice Thomas agreed in his concurrence with
Justice Macy’s view regarding the controlling effect of state law, opining that the
tribes were obligated to invoke state law “with respect to any change of use or
the implementation of any right to instream flow.”310 Justice Cardine saw things
similarly. “I would hold that a paper right, one that has never been applied to
practicably irrigable acreage or subsumed uses, may not be transferred to instream
flow,” he explained, which would “prevent the transfer of future water to instream
flow as applied for . . . in this appeal.”311
Dissenting on the instream flows issue were Justices Brown and Golden.
Contrary to Justice Macy’s statements in the majority opinion, Justice Brown
contended Big Horn I did not control this matter. Omitted from the host of
issues addressed in that case was any “issue regarding changing part of the reserved
right for agricultural purposes to a right to instream flow for fishery purposes.”312
Reliance on Big Horn I was ill-founded in Justice Brown’s view, and existing
authority—specifically, Arizona v. California—belied Justice Macy’s conclusion.313
This conclusion likewise could not be reconciled with the decrees that had been
issued by Judges Joffe and Johnson leading up to Big Horn I, the state’s petition
for rehearing in that case, and the state’s briefing in Wyoming v. United States.314
In sum, “[t]he district court, this court, and the United States Supreme Court
[had] recognized that the Tribes [were] entitled to dedicate their decreed water
to instream flows” by Justice Brown’s account.315 Justice Golden held a similar
opinion. He also referenced text in the Joffe and Johnson decrees suggesting the
tribes were not restricted to agricultural uses simply because the reserved right
had been quantified under the PIA standard.316 Nor had the court addressed this
issue in Big Horn I, as Justice Macy asserted had been clear and unequivocal,
according to Justice Golden.317 It was an issue Big Horn I did not reach, but that
should be resolved in the tribes’ favor under Winters and Arizona v. California.
Justice Golden would have held the tribes were entitled to use water afforded by
the reserved right “for any purpose they deem to be to their benefit,” including
instream flows.318
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Administration of Reserved Right. A similar 3-2 split occurred among the
justices on the administration issue. “The court addressed the role of the state
engineer as the administrator of the Tribes’ reserved water right in Big Horn I,”
declared Justice Macy in the majority opinion, expressing his view that “unified
administration by the state engineer of both reserved and state-permitted rights to
Wyoming water is essential to effective water management within the Big Horn
River System.”319 Contrary to Judge Hartman’s ruling—which had authorized
the tribes’ water resources control board to administer all water rights within
the reservation—Justice Macy reiterated the constitutional underpinnings and
contours of the administrative scheme announced in Big Horn I, faulted the
district court for assertedly violating the Wyoming Constitution, and called for
adherence to Big Horn I.320 Justice Thomas concurred with this result. He regarded
administration as the paramount issue and approached it in a geographical
manner. With respect to the ceded portion of the reservation, he concluded the
tribes lacked any “sovereign rights” to this area such that only the State Engineer
could administer water rights within it.321 In turn, although recognizing tribal
sovereignty over the diminished reservation, Justice Thomas also favored the State
Engineer serving as the sole regulatory authority in this domain, as “it would make
little sense to divide the regulatory function [given] the clear interrelationship
of the water courses and systems” in the ceded and diminished portions of the
reservation.322 Justice Brown shared this pragmatic concern. “A provision for
dual management would be unworkable, exacerbate a power struggle, and invite
continued litigation” in his view.323 To avoid this outcome, the State Engineer
should hold exclusive administrative authority.
Justices Cardine and Golden dissented from the majority’s conclusion.
“I do not agree that Wyoming law governs the administration of Indian water
rights,” described Justice Cardine, “[n]or do I agree that the State Engineer
should administer the tribal water rights to the exclusion of the Tribes.”324 As an
alternative to the administrative scheme set forth in Big Horn I—and contrary
to the pragmatic concerns of his colleagues—Justice Cardine would have held
that the tribes and the State Engineer “jointly administer the water rights on the
reservation and, in the event of disagreement, . . . turn to the court for resolution
of their dispute.”325 Justice Golden would have taken a further step. Initially
contesting the notion that water afforded by the tribes’ reserved right constitutes
“property of the state” over which the State Engineer must have control, Justice
319
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Golden construed Big Horn I as designating the State Engineer essentially as
a “water master” responsible for monitoring (rather than administering) the
reserved right.326 The State Engineer failed to fulfill this role in relation to the
tribes’ instream flow permit according to Justice Golden, thereby depriving the
tribes of the relief and protection contemplated by Big Horn I, and warranting
substitution of the tribal water resources control board for the State Engineer
by the district court.327 Viewing water regulation as an “important sovereign
power,” Justice Golden would have held that the “[t]ribes should monitor both
Tribal rights and non-Indian rights on the reservation, turning to the courts for
resolution of disputes.”328
In sum, although the Wyoming Supreme Court issued a splintered opinion
to resolve the instream flow and administrative conflicts in Big Horn III, its
upshot was that (1) the tribes were not authorized to dedicate water afforded by
their reserved right to instream flows, and (2) the State Engineer was responsible
for administering all water rights on the Wind River Indian Reservation.329
Faced with this outcome, the tribes considered appealing Big Horn III to the
U.S. Supreme Court—a decision that might have entailed a trajectory similar
to what had occurred in Big Horn I—but eventually steered clear of this path
due to concerns about the Court’s even-handedness and objectivity.330 It was at
this point in the adjudication—after roughly a dozen years had been invested
into Phase I—that former Special Master Roncalio (then as a private attorney)
posed a foreboding query: “Has the litigation ended? Who knows. How long are
the big horns of this dilemma!”331 Little did the former special master know it
would require a doubling of this initial investment to resolve a related line of cases
stemming from Big Horn I.
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One year after the Wyoming Supreme Court handed down Big Horn III, the Arkansas
Law Review published a thought-provoking brief prepared by tribal counsel in support of a petition
for rehearing: B. Kevin Gover, Catherine Baker Stetson & Susan M. Williams, In re: The General
Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System and All Other Sources in the
State of Wyoming, 46 Ark. L. Rev. 237 (1993). To be clear, this brief was not filed in the Wyoming
Supreme Court. See, e.g., O’Gara, supra note 14, at 243.
329

Katharine Collins, Fear of Supreme Court Leads Tribes to Accept an Adverse Decision, High
Country News, Oct. 19. 1992, at 1. See also O’Gara, supra note 14, at 243–44 (describing
deliberations among tribes’ legal counsel and others regarding appeal, including reflections on Big
Horn I ). One commentator advocated as an alternative response to Big Horn III pursuing federal
legislation that would have overruled the decision. Martinis, supra note 295, at 454 (asserting that
“Congress has a duty to avoid further proliferation of the misapplication of legal doctrines espoused
by the Big Horn III court,” and contending that “Congress should pass federal legislation to overrule
the Big Horn III decision, and thereby remove the legal disparity created by the decision.”).
330

331

Roncalio, supra note 272, at 213.
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b. Big Horn II and IV–VI: Walton Rights—
Diffusion and Delineation
Just as Big Horn III dovetailed with Big Horn I ’s holdings regarding the
composition and administration of the tribes’ reserved right, so too did three
subsequent opinions and one order from the Wyoming Supreme Court—Big
Horn II, IV, V, and VI—address (and in some instances clarify) Big Horn I ’s
holdings concerning water rights held by parties derived, or alleged to have been
derived, from the tribes’ reserved right. These derivative water rights consisted of
Walton rights and so-called “super Walton rights.” No less than sixteen years, from
February 1988 to March 2004, would be invested into claims related to these
water rights after Big Horn I.
The first in this “tributary” line of cases was Big Horn II.332 It addressed a
procedural issue: Were non-Indian successors of Indian allottees (i.e., Walton
claimants) who had not joined the appeal in Big Horn I nonetheless entitled
to Walton rights based upon the court’s holding in that case recognizing such
rights? 333 In short, the Wyoming Supreme Court said “yes.” Issuing its opinion
on November 30, 1990, the court held that “all parties who have appeared in the
case, at least to the extent of filing an answer, and have not been subsequently
dismissed,” were entitled to benefit from the court’s holding regarding Walton
rights in Big Horn I.334
Three years passed after Big Horn II before the next milestone, Big Horn IV,
which came in the form of an order issued by Chief Justice Macy of the Wyoming
Supreme Court on October 26, 1993.335 To put Big Horn IV in context, slightly
more than a year after Big Horn II had been decided, the district court issued
an order adopting procedures for filing and objecting to Walton claims.336 The
district court referred to Special Master Dolan those Walton claims that had been
remanded by Big Horn II—ten in total—and based on a report subsequently
issued by the special master, the district court entered a decree disposing of these
claims on July 30, 1992.337 The district court certified this decree to the Wyoming
332
In re the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System
and All Other Sources, 803 P.2d 61 (Wyo. 1990) (Big Horn II ).
333
Id. at 61–62. To reiterate, Big Horn I held that the Walton claimants who joined that appeal
should be awarded on remand Walton rights bearing 1868 priority dates for the practicably irrigable
acreage they were able to show had been irrigated by their Indian predecessors at the time title
passed or had been put under irrigation within a reasonable time after passage of title. See id. at 65.
334

Id. at 69.

Order Dismissing Appeal (October 26, 1993), available at http://bhrac.washakiecounty.
net/DocumentCenter/BHCR/2-26-14c.PDF [hereinafter Big Horn IV].
335

336
Order Adopting Walton Procedures (January 21, 1992), available at http://bhrac.washakie
county.net/DocumentCenter/BHCR/6-3-2014a.PDF.

Judgment and Decree (July 30, 1992), available at http://bhrac.washakiecounty.net/Docu
mentCenter/BHCR/4-7-2014.PDF.
337
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Supreme Court for a final judgment on the remanded claims. Two months later,
however, on September 28, 1992—the filing deadline for Walton claims under
the adopted procedures—419 new claims were filed in the district court.338 The
tribes and the United States objected to these claims, and it was in this particular
posture that Chief Justice Macy issued the order that constituted Big Horn IV.
This order denied the district court’s certification of its decree and instead required
full adjudication of all Walton claims before the Wyoming Supreme Court would
consider any subsequent decisions on them.339
Big Horn V, in turn, came into existence slightly less than two years after
hearings began on the 419 Walton claims that precipitated Big Horn IV.340 The
case focused on claims for so-called “super-Walton rights” as referenced above.
These water rights were premised on the notion that non-Indian parties who
had acquired patents to parcels in the ceded portion of the Wind River Indian
Reservation under the disposal era laws thereby acquired water rights appurtenant
to these lands with an 1868 priority date because the tribes originally had owned
the lands.341 The district court rejected these claims, prompting an appeal, and the
Wyoming Supreme Court followed suit. In the higher court’s view, “[w]hen the
tribes ceded their land to the United States for sale, the reserved right disappeared
because the purpose for which it was recognized no longer pertained.”342 More
precisely, “[t]hat purpose no longer existed for lands acquired by others after they
had been ceded to the United States for disposition,” with the effect that “the
reserved water rights were eliminated as to those tracts.”343 The clear implication
of Big Horn I and II according to the court was that only “the Tribes, Indian
allottees, and successors in title of Indian allottees” could hold water rights with
an 1868 priority date.344 Big Horn V thus precluded further extension of Waltontype claims and reduced the pending claims to 264.345 This number dropped to
221 afterward due to claimants dismissing or withdrawing claims.346
338
Judgment and Decree on Remand—Walton Type Claims 2 (March 4, 2004), available at
http://bhrac.washakiecounty.net/DocumentCenter/BHCR/judgementedit12313.pdf [hereinafter
2004 Decree].

Big Horn IV, supra note 335, at 1 (granting motion to dismiss appeal due to abuse of
discretion by district court in improvidently certifying case for review).
339

340
See 2004 Decree, supra note 338, at 2 (describing how after Big Horn IV the district court
“directed the Special Master to begin hearings on the 419 Walton right claims.”). For a useful
discussion of Big Horn V, see Ryan H. Childs, Note, Drawing the Line on Indian Reserved Water
Rights: No “super–Walton” Rights in Wyoming’s Big Horn River System, 31 Land & Water L. Rev.
425 (1996).
341
In re the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System
and All Other Sources, 899 P.2d 848, 849 (Wyo. 1995) (Big Horn V ).
342

Id. at 854.

343

Id.

344

Id. at 855.

345

2004 Decree, supra note 338, at 2.

346

Id.
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Decided after a nearly seven-year hiatus at the state supreme court level
following Big Horn V, the last in this line of cases involving derivative water
rights was Big Horn VI.347 There was little rest for the special masters and the
district court across this interim period. Individual Walton claims hearings were
conducted, an order addressing pervasive legal issues that emerged from these
hearings (“global Walton issues”) was issued, Special Master Kropf prepared a
report and recommendation for the Walton claims, and Judge Hartman eventually
entered an amended decree disposing of these claims on August 30, 2000.348 Big
Horn VI was an appeal from this decree. It revolved around the phrase “reasonable
time” as it had been used in Big Horn I with respect non-Indian successors’
Walton rights. The court announced a different rule than had been applied by
the special master and district court regarding Walton claims brought by parties
that purchased land from Indian allottees who depended on water from the Wind
River Irrigation Project—a Bureau of Indian Affairs project on the Wind River
Reservation. Because of the prolonged construction of this project, ten to twenty
years elapsed between these claimants’ land purchases and project water deliveries
to their parcels.349 Given this situation, the court held:
[I]n order to establish beneficial use of the reserved water within
a reasonable time to retain the federal reserved right, [these]
claimants must demonstrate their efforts to put the lands under
irrigation within a reasonable time and with due diligence, as
defined by state law, after the federal project facilities became
available to the properties.350
On remand, the parties agreed to a stipulation that confirmed Walton rights
for the Big Horn VI claimants, thereby resolving the last of the 221 claims that
persisted in the wake of Big Horn V.351 Issued on March 4, 2004, Judge Hartman’s
post-Big Horn VI amended decree identified the collective Walton rights award
resulting from these Phase I tributary cases as authorizing 89,574 acre-feet of
annual diversions.352
Four years after Big Horn VI was decided, in 2008, the Winters centennial
took place. A compilation of papers and remarks was prepared in conjunction
347
In re the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System
and All Other Sources, 48 P.3d 1040 (2002) (Big Horn VI ).
348

2004 Decree, supra note 338, at 2–3.

349

Big Horn VI, 48 P.3d at 1044.

Id. at 1055 (emphasis added). Later in the opinion the court also held that that calculation
of “reasonable time” begins at the point when an original allottee transfers title to an original
grantee—i.e., this calculation could not be restarted after this point due to a subsequent purchase of
the parcel by an Indian party. Id. at 1056.
350

351

2004 Decree, supra note 338, at 3.

352

This figure is set forth in id. on page 11 of the tabulation attached as Exhibit A.
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with this landmark that offered rich insights into the milestones of Phase I of the
Big Horn adjudication. Included within this compilation were entries from Susan
Williams, again the tribes’ advocate in Wyoming v. United States; Jeff Fassett, the
State Engineer during nearly all of the Phase I litigation, including Big Horn III;
and Craig Alexander, the head of the section of the U.S. Department of Justice that
had represented the United States in these cases. Following a survey of the Phase
I decisions by Ms. Williams,353 Mr. Fassett characterized the long trail plainly:
“Wyoming has been used as a poster child for how not to quantify reserved water
rights—through pure, hard-fought litigation. We got off on the wrong foot and
found it impossible to stop the litigation chain.”354 It was not that one could not
discern any redeeming value in this phase suggested Mr. Fassett, “[b]ut clearly
the hard-fought litigation left ill will among the parties. It damaged relationships.
And it damaged the neighborhood.”355 Of related and equal importance, “clearly
the result of our litigation is that we have a solution from the courts, not a solution
by the parties.”356 To a similar effect were Mr. Alexander’s remarks. “Adjudications
involving Indian rights must have a settlement component if there is to be a
resolution of a tribe’s water needs,” he described, “the Big Horn litigation provides
an important cautionary tale about the dangers of trying to completely resolve
water disputes through adjudication.”357 The contrasting approach to federal
reserved rights in Phase II would directly reflect this dialogue about alternative
methods for resolving water conflicts.

C. Phase II: Federal Reserved Rights
Having traced the trajectory of the Indian reserved right claims, including
the various derivate water rights claims, at issue in Phase I of the Big Horn
adjudication, it is now necessary to circle back more than two decades to the order
of certification and referral issued to Special Master Roncalio on May 22, 1979.358
Beyond requiring the special master to address the Indian reserved right held by
the Eastern Shoshone and Northern Arapaho tribes, that order also charged him

353

Williams, supra note 9, at 169–74.

Gordon “Jeff ” Fassett, Results Following Litigation: The Wind River Tribes/Big Horn River,
in The Future of Indian and Federal Reserved Water Rights: The Winters Centennial 174
(Barbara Cosens and Judith V. Royster eds., 2012). See also id. at 176 (“The result of this litigation
was damaged relationships. But the relationships are healing due to time and the fact that interests
have changed.”).
354

355

Id. at 174.

356

Id. at 175.

Alexander, supra note 306, at 176. See also id. at 177 (“Although settlement discussions
tend to be time-consuming and costly, in the long term only settlements can bring the parties
together in a way that creates the working relationships and agreements that are necessary to ensure
water for the tribes’ needs, as well as the needs of non-Indian water users.”).
357

358

Certification and Referral Order, supra note 219.
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with disposing of federal reserved rights claims asserted by the United States.359
As just alluded to, the dispute resolution method through which the parties
addressed these latter claims bore a night-and-day relationship with the extensive
litigation by which the former claims were resolved. The United States and the
State of Wyoming ultimately negotiated a settlement of the federal reserved rights
involved in Phase II of the Big Horn adjudication, embodying that settlement
in a partial interlocutory decree entered roughly four years after Special Master
Roncalio had been appointed, and effectuating it in a final decree twenty-two
years later.

1. Toward Settlement
It should be noted at the outset that, nearly a year prior to Special Master
Roncalio’s appointment in May 1979,360 the U.S. Supreme Court handed down
another landmark decision in its federal reserved rights jurisprudence: U.S. v.
New Mexico.361 As already mentioned, this case addressed how federal reserved
rights were to be quantified. The general existence of these rights could not be
doubted in good faith after Arizona v. California,362 and Cappaert had indicated
that they encompassed in quantity “only that amount of water necessary
to fulfill the purpose of the reservation, no more.”363 It was not until U.S. v.
New Mexico, however, that the Court dealt with the quantification issue in a
slightly more precise (albeit nuanced) way. The case emerged out of a general
stream adjudication of the Rio Mimbres system in southwestern New Mexico in
which the United States asserted reserved rights for the Gila National Forest.364
Wyoming Attorney General Frank Mendicino—who had filed the complaint
in the Big Horn adjudication in February 1977— joined attorney generals from
seven other western states in filing an amicus brief.365 Long story short, the Court
announced in U.S. v. New Mexico a primary purposes/secondary uses distinction
that governed the quantification of federal reserved rights, both in the case (i.e.,
for national forests) and more broadly. “Where water is necessary to fulfill the very
purposes for which a federal reservation was created,” described the Court, “it is
reasonable to conclude . . . that the United States intended to reserve the necessary
water.”366 Conversely, “[w]here water is only valuable for a secondary use of the
reservation . . . there arises the contrary inference that Congress intended . . . that

359

Id. at 2.

360

Appointment Order, supra note 218.

361

United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978).

362

Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 601 (1963).

363

Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 141 (1976).

364

New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 697–98.

365

Id. at 697.

366

Id. at 702.
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the United States would acquire water in the same manner as any other public or
private appropriator”—i.e., under state law.367
Exactly how U.S. v. New Mexico may have affected settlement negotiations
between the United States and the State of Wyoming in Phase II of the Big Horn
adjudication is unclear to this author, but the parties’ eventual formation of their
settlement was not a foregone conclusion. The United States filed its statement of
federal reserved rights claims and an accompanying “legal parameters” document
on March 10, 1980, and for the next two-and-a-half years these claims remained
slated for trial.368 Included among the United States’ claims were those asserted
for Yellowstone National Park (Middle Creek drainage), Big Horn Canyon
National Recreation Area, Big Horn and Shoshone national forests, and various
lands administered by the Bureau of Land Management in the Wind-Big Horn
Basin.369 Broadly speaking, the interim period between the United States’
assertion of these claims and the parties’ subsequent formation of a settlement
was marked by a series of stipulations concerning the claims—and, in some cases,
withdrawals of them370—and scheduling orders from Special Master Roncalio
granting continuances of pretrial conferences and trial.371 Notwithstanding these
continuances and their role in facilitating settlement efforts, the special master
eventually set trial for two weeks in December 1982 and one week in March

367
Id. See also id. at 700 (describing how in its earlier reserved rights cases the Court had
“carefully examined both the asserted water right and the specific purposes for which the land was
reserved, and concluded that without the water the purposes of the reservation would be entirely
defeated.”). Bringing the primary purposes/secondary uses distinction to bear on the quantity of
the United States’ reserved rights for the Gila National Forest, a majority of the Court interpreted
the Organic Act of 1897 as embodying two primary purposes: “to conserve the water flows, and to
furnish a continuous supply of timber for the people.” Id. at 707. The dissent discerned as a third
primary purpose “improving and protecting the forest.” Id. at 720 (Powell, J., dissenting).

United States’ Statement of Claims (March 10, 1980), available at http://bhrac.washakie
county.net/DocumentCenter/BHCR/14HRR90000.pdf [hereinafter Statement of Claims]; Legal
Parameters for United States’ Statement of Claims (March 10, 1980), available at http://bhrac.
washakiecounty.net/DocumentCenter/BHCR/BAAOAH0000.pdf [hereinafter Legal Parameters].
368

369

Statement of Claims, supra note 368, at 16–33; Legal Parameters, supra note 368, at 16–30.

Several of these stipulations and withdrawals are noted in the Final Phase Decree
Covering the United States’ Non-Indian Claims (November 29, 2005), available at http://bhrac.
washakiecounty.net/DocumentCenter/BHCR/BAAOAH0000.pdf [hereinafter Final Decree]. See
id. at 55–56 (stipulation addressing reserved rights claims for water-producing oil and gas wells), 58
(stipulation addressing reserved rights claims for Bureau of Reclamation projects), 59 (withdrawal of
claims for reserved rights for East Fork and Whiskey Basin Elk Winter Ranges), 59–60 (withdrawal
of reserved rights claims for instream flows along streams on Bureau of Land Management lands).
See also id. at 90 (dismissal of reserved rights claims for flows at hydropower sites).
370

371
Order Continuing Proceeding Concerning Federal Non-Indian Claims and Setting Trial
Date for United States Rebuttal (January 21, 1982), available at http://bhrac.washakiecounty.net/
DocumentCenter/BHCR/PC2TP80000.pdf; Order (May 13, 1982), available at http://bhrac.
washakiecounty.net/DocumentCenter/BHCR/3ATT2T0000.pdf.
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1983.372 The order prescribing this schedule identified a host of interesting and
contested issues raised by the parties regarding the federal reserved rights claims.
Among other matters, these issues concerned the existence of federal reserved
rights within the basin and state, the assessment of primary purposes under
U.S. v. New Mexico, the quantification method for federal reserved rights, and the
application of the reserved rights doctrine to groundwater.373 At the end of the
day, however, these issues would not be litigated.
A stipulation and agreement formed by the United States and the State of
Wyoming on November 20, 1982—a little more than a week before trial was set
to begin—changed forever the outcome of Phase II.374 Referencing the parties’
sustained efforts “to resolve their differences” over the federal reserved rights
through negotiation, this document included a proposed partial interlocutory
decree intended “to be a full and final resolution or means for resolution” of
these claims (i.e., “all non-Indian claims the United States has filed, or could
have filed, for water rights based upon federal law in this adjudication”).375 The
parties submitted the decree to the court contemporaneous with their execution
of the stipulation and agreement, and they attached to the decree a package of
documents addressing the procedure through which it would be reviewed by other
parties in the adjudication. In an order issued two days later, the court approved
the review procedure, establishing January 21, 1983, as a deadline for objections
to the decree and February 9, 1983, as a hearing date for any such objections.376
It was on the latter date that Judge Joffe eventually entered the partial inter
locutory decree.377

2. Final Decree
Moving forward in time twenty-two years from the partial interlocutory
decree’s entry, the district court—specifically, Judge Hartman, toward the end
of his tenure—approved and entered a final Phase II decree in the Big Horn
adjudication on November 29, 2005.378 The United States and the State of

372
Pre-Trial Conference Report and Order 4 (October 19, 1982), available at http://bhrac.
washakiecounty.net/DocumentCenter/BHCR/3-11-14a.PDF.
373

Id. at 1–3.

This stipulation and agreement are attached as Exhibit C to the Partial Interlocutory Decree
and Supporting Documents Regarding the United States’ Non-Indian Claims (February 9, 1983),
available at http://bhrac.washakiecounty.net/DocumentCenter/BHCR/11112ab.pdf [hereinafter
Partial Interlocutory Decree].
374

375

Id. at 1, 3.

This order—entitled an “Order Approving Procedure for Consideration of Entry of
Proposed Partial Interlocutory Decree”—is attached as Exhibit B to Partial Interlocutory Decree,
supra note 374.
376

377

Partial Interlocutory Decree, supra note 374, at 715.

378

Final Decree, supra note 370.
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Wyoming initially submitted this decree to the court and moved for its entry, and
the court then circulated the decree to all parties and counsel of record without
any objections being filed.379 The decree’s nuances are many, and it would go
beyond this article’s scope to canvass them, but a few broad remarks about salient
features are in order.
The decree begins with a suite of general provisions. With the exception of
the reserved right for the Wind River Indian Reservation, it constitutes “a final
statement, quantification, and adjudication of all water rights which the United
States has claimed or could have claimed . . . as part of [the Big Horn adjudication]
under either federal or state law.”380 By the decree’s terms, these rights “shall in
the first instance be administered by the State of Wyoming,” and the United
States must “request the State Engineer to exercise his administrative authority”
before “seeking judicial enforcement.”381 Also relevant to administration, the
decree limits the types of water rights for which changes may be sought to those
involving “discrete uses,”382 further providing that such changes must be obtained
from the Board of Control under state law.383
With regard to the substance of the rights contained in it, the decree initially
specifies the boundaries and establishment dates of the federal reservations to
which these rights attach.384 It then goes on (1) to grant rights for some of these
reservations,385 (2) to outline the features of the granted rights, and (3) to identify
several instances in which rights that had been asserted by the United States in its
statement of claims were not granted for particular reasons.386 Specific reservations
for which the decree grants rights include Yellowstone National Park;387 Big Horn

379

Id. at 1–2.

380

Id. at 7.

381

Id. at 7.

Id. at 8. See also id. at 3 (defining “discrete use” as “a measurable and identifiable use of
water on the Bighorn National Forest or Shoshone National Forest . . . and any other federal land.”).
382

383

Id. at 8.

384

Id. at 10–44.

See, e.g., id. at 49 (denying reserved rights claims for Big Horn Canyon National Recreation Area).
385

386

Id. at 44–91.

Id. at 44–49. These rights secure instream flows for Yellowstone National Park’s Middle
Creek drainage, including flows in Middle Creek and its tributaries, water levels of two unnamed
lakes within the drainage, and flows of all of the drainage’s springs and seeps. Id. at 44–48. The
priority date of these rights is March 1, 1929. Id. at 49. The decree disavows any reservation of
groundwater needed to maintain the national park in its natural condition, although it also expressly
disclaims barring litigation over groundwater withdrawals. Id. at 48.
387
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and Shoshone national forests;388 various public water reserves,389 stock drive
ways,390 and water-producing oil and gas wells;391 and wells392 and reservoirs393
on non-reserved lands managed by the Bureau of Land Management. Notably,
although the decree describes all of the foregoing water rights as being “based
on precepts of federal law,”394 it only refers to those associated with the waterproducing oil and gas wells as “reserved water right[s].”395 Further, at several places
in the decree, provisos appear indicating that a particular right being granted
“shall be deemed to be and shall be administered and enforced as junior to any
existing water right permitted or certificated under Wyoming Law, if the exercise,
operation, or use of [the right] conflicts with the exercise, operation, or use of
the right permitted or certificated under Wyoming law.”396 Interested readers
undoubtedly will find other provisions of the final decree worthy of review, but
with this snapshot a transition from Phase II to Phase III is in line.

Multiple types of rights attach to the Big Horn and Shoshone national forests under the
decree. Some of these rights entitle the United States “to pass certain amounts of water, measured in
acre-feet, past specified points on certain natural streams in the Big Horn and Shoshone National
Forests . . . .” Id. at 61. Table 7 of the decree identifies the specific elements of these rights. Id.
Other rights entitle the United States to maintain springs and seeps subject to certain quantitative
limitations. Id. at 73–74. A third variety of rights entitle the United States to use water for various
“discrete uses.” Id. at 74–83. See also id. at 3 (defining “discrete use” generally as a “measurable and
identifiable use of water” on the national forests). Tables 8, 9, 10, and 11 of the decree address these
uses. Id. at 74, 78, 79, 83. A final strand of rights associated with the national forests allow for water
uses for administrative purposes, fighting fires, and stock watering. Id. at 60–61, 84–90.
388

389
Id. at 50–51. These rights are to be used “solely for drinking by human beings and wildlife
and for stockwatering.” Id. at 51. Table 1 of the decree sets forth their specific elements. Id. at 50.
390
Id. at 51–55. These rights allow for (1) maintenance of instream flows within stock drive
ways for stockwatering and drinking by human beings, and (2) storage of water in stock driveway
reservoirs for the same purposes. Id. Tables 2 and 3 of the decree set forth the specific elements of
these rights. Id. at 52–53.
391
Id. at 55–56. Table 4 of the decree identifies the specific elements of these “reserved water
right[s].” Id. at 56. Those attached to two of the wells, the Rose Dome and Sand Draw wells, are to
be used solely for agricultural and domestic purposes. Id. at 56.

Id. at 56–57. These rights are to be used solely for “providing drinking water for people,
stock and wildlife,” and they bear a priority date of November 1, 1982. Id. at 57. Table 5 of the
decree sets forth the quantities of use permitted under these rights. Id.
392

Id. at 57–58. These rights similarly are to be used solely for “providing drinking water for
people, stock and wildlife,” and they bear a priority date of November 1, 1982. Id. at 57. The decree
prohibits storage of more than twenty acre-feet in the reservoirs. Id. Table 6 of the decree lists these
rights. Id.
393

394

Id. at 44.

395

Id. at 56.

Such provisos can be found in this form and similar ones in id. at 50 (public water reserves),
53 (stock driveway instream flows), 55 (stock driveway reservoirs), 62–64 (quantified water flow
uses for Big Horn and Shoshone national forests), and 73–74 (springs and seeps in Big Horn and
Shoshone national forests).
396
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D. Phase III: Appropriative Rights
Phase III of the Big Horn adjudication resembled Phase II in that its
milestones did not consist of a series of Wyoming Supreme Court decisions as with
Phase I.397 Overlapping in time with the other phases to an extent, Phase III was
the longest-running of the group, spanning nearly thirty years in total—from May
1985 to September 2014. To clarify its focus, consider again the complaint filed by
Wyoming Attorney General Frank Mendicino on January 24, 1977, to initiate the
adjudication.398 The complaint’s text mirrored the adjudication statute in defining
the water resources subject to the proceeding: “the Big Horn River, all surface
streams and rivers tributary thereto, including but not limited to the Wind River,
and all ground and underground tributary thereto,” as well as “all other surface
and ground waters underlying or within Water Division Number Three.”399 The
breakdown of subject water rights also tracked the statute. In relevant part, the
complaint asked the court (1) to “[c]onfirm those rights evidenced by previous
court decrees, by certificates of appropriation, or by certificates of construction”
previously issued by the Board of Control, and (2) to “[d]etermine the status
of all uncancelled permits to acquire the right to the use of the water of the
State of Wyoming and adjudicate all perfected rights” under these permits that
had not been adjudicated.400 These certificated and decreed rights, as well as the
uncancelled permits, fell within Special Master Roncalio’s charge in the order of
certification and referral two years later.401 Per the parties’ stipulation, they were to
be addressed after the special master and district court had determined the Indian
and federal reserved rights, which ultimately took place in May 1985 after Judge
Johnson issued the amended judgment and decree appealed in Big Horn I, and the
United States and State of Wyoming negotiated the partial interlocutory decree
for the federal reserved rights claims.402

397
The Wyoming Supreme Court did hand down one decision involving Phase III in 2004,
Big Horn VII, which is the most recent appellate opinion that has been issued in the adjudication.
In re the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System and All
Other Sources, 85 P.3d 981 (Wyo. 2004) (Big Horn VII ) (denying claim for implied secondary
rights to water in Buffalo Bill Reservoir brought by irrigators seeking to intervene in adjudication).
As described supra note 16, two appeals involving discrete Phase III matters are currently pending
before the Wyoming Supreme Court, both of which were filed after the district court entered its
final order concluding the adjudication in September 2014.
398

Complaint, supra note 157.

399

Id. at 1.

400

Id. at 4.

401

Certification and Referral Order, supra note 219, at 1–2.

402

Roncalio Report, supra note 153, at 25–26.
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1. Procedural Cornerstone
What exactly happened in May 1985 once Phase III was set to move forward?
The wheels began to turn with the laying of a procedural cornerstone by the
district court in the form of the Big Horn Adjudication Phase III Procedures.403
In a manner similar to the three-phase stipulation for the adjudication as a whole,
these procedures would structure the entirety of Phase III. At the time of their
adoption, they anticipated the adjudication would be “finally concluded, excepting
appeals to appellate courts, by or before December 31, 1988,” and instructed
parties to “make every effort to meet this goal.”404 One might say Phase III proved
to be the gift that kept on giving in this respect, however, as it would overshoot
this mark by nearly twenty-six years, notwithstanding the appeals exception. The
Phase III procedures would persist across this period, governing the duties and
interactions of the district judges, special masters, Board of Control, and State
Engineer in relation to thousands of matters. The procedures would evolve over
this time frame—being amended four times before assuming a lasting shape in
May 1997—but would consistently serve as the structural framework for this
part of the adjudication.405 Precisely what transpired in Phase III under the
procedures perhaps can best be synthesized by considering the specific measures
they called for in relation to the two types of water interests at issue—again,
(1) certificated and decreed rights (“adjudicated certificates”) and (2) uncancelled
permits that had been issued by the Board of Control but not adjudicated
(“unadjudicated permits”).406
Turning initially to the adjudicated certificates, the Phase III procedures
provided that the Board of Control would “report a list of all Certificates issued
prior to January 1, 1977, to the Special Master.”407 This cutoff date aligned with
the adjudication’s commencement. “As no certificates have been issued during the
pendency of this action,” explained the district court, “after January 1, 1977, none

403
Big Horn Adjudication Phase III—Procedures (May 15, 1985), available at http://bhrac.
washakiecounty.net/DocumentCenter/BHCR/EXWF5T0000.pdf.
404

Id. at 6.

1997 Amended Big Horn Adjudication Phase III—Procedures (March 31, 1997), available
at http://bhrac.washakiecounty.net/DocumentCenter/BHCR/6LKHST0000.pdf [hereinafter Phase
III Procedures]. These procedures were adopted in an Order Changing Phase III Procedures (May
19, 1997), available at http://bhrac.washakiecounty.net/DocumentCenter/BHCR/ZKUUYF0000.
pdf. For additional amendments to the procedures, see Order Changing Phase III Procedures (July
26, 1993), available at http://bhrac.washakiecounty.net/DocumentCenter/BHCR/QTHH650000.
pdf; Order (May 8, 1987), available at http://bhrac.washakiecounty.net/DocumentCenter/BHCR/
S7XFNS0000.pdf; Amended Big Horn Adjudication Phase III—Procedures (January 21, 1986),
available at http://bhrac.washakiecounty.net/DocumentCenter/BHCR/MVSOZE0000.pdf.
405

406
For useful descriptions of the Board of Control’s adjudication process, including citations
to the statutory provisions governing it, see MacDonnell, supra note 94, at 108–10, 201–202.
407

Phase III Procedures, supra note 405, at 4.
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will be reported.”408 The compilation of adjudicated certificates referenced in the
Phase III procedures was called the “Tab Book,”409 and as ultimately submitted by
the board included roughly 27,000 certificates.410 With this submission in hand,
the procedures called for the court to “confirm all adjudicated certificates”—which
took place in an order issued May 15, 1985—and for the special master to issue a
subsequent order requiring all parties who sought to challenge these certificates to
do so by year’s end (December 31, 1985).411 After this deadline passed, the Phase
III procedures dictated that the special master would schedule hearings on all
contested certificates and make recommendations to the court regarding whether
specific certificates should be confirmed or deemed abandoned.412
As for the unadjudicated permits, they numbered approximately 4,000
as set forth in the Phase III procedures, generally consisting of those issued to
parties in Water Division III since the turn of the twentieth century that had
not yet been adjudicated.413 Roughly one quarter of these permits (1,200) had
been partially adjudicated but described acreage in excess of the adjudication
set forth in them—excess that had to be “proved up” or cancelled by the State
Engineer.414 The remaining three-quarters or so of the permits (2,709) had not
been evaluated by the Board of Control and therefore needed to be adjudicated or
cancelled.415 Taken together, the Phase III procedures dictated that these permits
would be “adjudicated by the Board of Control and special master in batches
as they matured.”416 In short, the procedures called for the staffs of the Board
of Control and the State Engineer to investigate the status of all unadjudicated
permits, and the special master to review the record of, and to schedule hearings as
needed on, all contested permits recommended for adjudication or cancellation.417
The district court would dispose of uncontested permits directly.418 As with the
adjudicated certificates, the court set December 31, 1984, as a general cutoff for

In re the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System
and All Other Sources, 85 P.3d 981, 986 (2003) (Big Horn VII ).
408

409

Phase III Procedures, supra note 405, at 4.

410

Big Horn VII, 85 P.3d at 986.

Phase III Procedures, supra note 405, at 4–5. See also Big Horn VII, 85 P.3d at 994. The
district court’s initial confirmation of the adjudicated certificates thus was provisional due to the
possibility of such challenges.
411

412

Phase III Procedures, supra note 405, at 4. See also Big Horn VII, 85 P.3d at 994.

413

Phase III Procedures, supra note 405, at 1.

414

Id. at 2.

415

Id.

416

Big Horn VII, 85 P.3d at 994–95.

417

Phase III Procedures, supra note 405, at 6.

418

Id. at 6 –7.
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the scope of permits that would be handled in the adjudication.419 This cutoff was
needed for the adjudication to be “capable of completion.”420

2. On the Ground, In the Trenches
Going forward from the initial adoption of the Phase III procedures in May
1985, things generally played out on the ground in the manner contemplated by
the procedures over the next three decades, although as noted earlier the procedures
themselves evolved in various respects while being implemented. Actions
undertaken on the adjudicated certificates on one hand, and the unadjudicated
permits on the other, proceeded along parallel but separate tracks.
As for the 27,000 adjudicated certificates set forth in the Tab Book, they did
not end up imposing the lion’s share of the administrative workload in Phase III.
After their provisional confirmation by the district court in May 1985, only a
handful of parties (perhaps as few as two) ended up challenging these certificates
as involuntarily abandoned by the end-of-year cutoff.421 Little effort was required.
Beyond these nearly non-existent abandonment challenges, the other vein of
administrative tasks involving the adjudicated certificates concerned petitions for
changes to them—petitions for a change in point of diversion, type or place of
use, or voluntary abandonment.422 The Board of Control exercised its statutory
authority to consider these petitions throughout Phase III, submitting reports
to the district court with findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommended
interlocutory decrees.423 The district court then reviewed the board’s reports and
issued interlocutory decrees disposing of the petitions.424
It was the unadjudicated permits that proved to be the demanding matter over
the course of Phase III. Although the Phase III procedures originally identified
the existence of approximately 4,000 of these permits (as of February 1985),425
this figure ended up being slightly more than 15,000 by the close of the phase.426
419
Id. at 4–5. An exception to this general cutoff existed for pre-1985 permits for which
extensions had been granted such that beneficial use or reservoir completion would take place after
December 31, 1988. Such permits could be excluded from the adjudication by order of the special
master. Id. at 5.
420

Big Horn VII, 85 P.3d at 995.

Telephone Interview, Nancy McCann, Adjudication Manager, Wyoming State Board of
Control (November 6, 2014) [hereinafter McCann Interview].
421

422

See Phase III Procedures, supra note 405, at 20 (setting procedures for change applications).

An example of a Board of Control report can be found at Petition to Set Aside Interlocutory
Decree 13–18 (June 10, 2003), available at http://bhrac.washakiecounty.net/DocumentCenter/
BHCR/ZTFQTS0000.pdf.
423

424

An example of one of these interlocutory decrees can be found in id. at 19–21.

425

Phase III Procedures, supra note 405, at 1.

Email from Nancy McCann, Adjudication Manager, Wyoming State Board of Control
(November 7, 2014) (on file with author).
426
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These unadjudicated permits consisted of 4,610 surface water permits and 10,500
groundwater permits.427 Included among the surface water permits were 2,709 for
ditches, 931 for enlargements, 660 for reservoirs, and 310 for stock reservoirs.428
Roughly speaking, the Board of Control adjudicated less than thirty percent of
these permits such that certificates were issued for them.429 The remaining permits
were cancelled.430 With regard to the groundwater permits, the Board of Control
adjudicated 7,731 de minimis wells (those with capacity rates of less than twentyfive gallons per minute) and 500 non-de minimis ones.431 Certificates were issued
exclusively for the latter wells, and again the remaining (non-adjudicated) 1,800
or so permits were cancelled.432 The time period over which this labor occurred
again extended twenty-nine years, from May 1985 to September 2014, although
budgetary constraints and a related need to prioritize Walton rights claims at
issue in Phase I briefly halted the process in the early 2000s.433 Overall, if the
total number of unadjudicated permits (15,110) addressed under the Phase III
procedures is divided by the total time span (twenty-nine years), an average of 521
permits were disposed of annually.
The specific measure that eventually brought Phase III to its conclusion was
an order issued on September 5, 2014, by Judge Skar.434 The order terminated the
Phase III procedures and provided for the Board of Control and State Engineer
to exercise their respective statutory authority over the water rights that had been
adjudicated in the proceeding. With this pen stroke, the district court wrapped-up
Phase III nearly thirty years after it had been set in motion.

E. Closure
Judge Skar signed the order terminating the Phase III procedures at a
ceremony in the Washakie County District Courtroom in Worland, Wyoming,
on September 5, 2014. Termination of the Phase III procedures was an
important part of this ceremony, but its purpose was broader: signing of the
final order concluding the Big Horn adjudication. This milestone had been a
long time coming. Preparations for it spanned the preceding decade, going as
far back as an initial meeting convened in April 2004 by an ad hoc committee
assembled by Judge Hartman to offer procedural recommendations for the
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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McCann Interview, supra note 421.

Order Terminating Phase III Procedures Big Horn River General Adjudication (September
5, 2014), available at http://bhrac.washakiecounty.net/DocumentCenter/BHCR/9-29-14c.PDF.
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adjudication’s conclusion.435 Phase III was estimated to be completed by 2006
when the committee later issued its recommendations—a prognosis respectfully
more than eight years off the mark—but these recommendations, including
proposed text for the orders eventually signed by Judge Skar on this historic day,
proved precedential.436
A menagerie of individuals filled the courtroom for the signing ceremony—a
relatively modest assemblage of state and tribal officials coupled with varied
others whose lives and livelihoods had been touched by the Big Horn adjudication
in one way or another.437 A sense of release hung in the air. It seemed to be a
shared feeling, notwithstanding the undoubtedly diverse reasons for it, and
gradually increased in intensity as the proceeding unfolded, perhaps analogous
to a drum crescendo. Although no longer a judicial official, Judge Hartman was
invited to offer reflections, and he shared candidly and earnestly his views on the
relative value of the adjudication and the significance of the final order. Judge
Skar followed suit with similar remarks, and Special Master Kropf captured the
historic event in photographs. The finale, of course, was the final order’s signing
and entry by Judge Skar.438 Describing that the matters presented in Phase I,
Phase II, and Phase III had been decided by final orders, and that all rights to
use of the water in the Big Horn River System and all other sources in Water
Division III had been adjudicated, the order declared that the adjudication was
concluded. The order then looked to the future. It recognized that “unforeseen
problems may develop regarding the rights adjudicated in this litigation” and
stated that, “[i]f cooperative efforts fail to resolve future problems, the parties
may invoke the jurisdiction of this Court as provided in Big Horn I and Big Horn
III” subject to the order’s provisions.439 One such provision allowed parties to seek
supplemental relief, including judicial enforcement, for legal questions arising
from the adjudication. Before such relief could be sought, however, the requesting
party would be obligated to “meet and confer with all other parties that may be
directly affected by the request . . . and attempt to negotiate a settlement of the

435
Ad Hoc Committee, Big Horn Adjudication: Recommendations for Concluding the
Adjudication Submitted to Judge Gary H. Hartman (November 6, 2005), available at http://bhrac.
washakiecounty.net/DocumentCenter/BHCR/RPND9B0000.pdf.
436
Id. at 7, 33, 35–36. Notably, the committee advised against drafting and issuance of a
“comprehensive final decree document” to wrap up the adjudication. Id. at 8. It regarded such a
decree as undesirable based on the view that “an effort to summarize or digest past information
and decisions would inevitably lead to new rounds of conflict.” Id. It also considered such a decree
impractical “because of the difficulty of choosing what information and what decisions from the
long history of this case should be included in one comprehensive document.” Id.

The author had the good fortune of attending this ceremony and offers these anecdotal remarks.
437

438
Final Order (September 5, 2014), available at http://bhrac.washakiecounty.net/Document
Center/BHCR/9-29-14a.PDF.
439

Id.
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matter in issue.”440 It was on this note of judicially mandated cooperation and
negotiation that the district court drew to a close what up to this point constitutes
the only general stream adjudication undertaken by the State of Wyoming441—a
proceeding elapsing more than thirty-seven years, involving more than 20,000
water rights claimants,442 and consuming literally untold millions of dollars.443

V. Conclusion
“Here is a land where life is written in water.”444 These words were penned by
the State of Colorado’s poet laureate, Thomas Hornsby Ferril, in 1940 and have
been etched on the state capitol rotunda. Perhaps they also should be strung on
a banner across the Wind-Big Horn Basin. The scale, complexity, cost, and in
many respects contentiousness of the Big Horn adjudication speak to the essential
nature of the resource for which the adjudication was employed to draw lines.
Its features provide an excellent reference point when considered in relation to

440

Id.

As mentioned supra note 16, two appeals concerning water permits at issue in Phase III
have been filed in the Wyoming Supreme Court since Judge Skar’s issuance of the final order, but
neither of these appeals (given their very narrow focus) undermine the notion that the Big Horn
adjudication effectively has concluded.
441

In re the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System
and All Other Sources, 835 P.2d 273, 275 (Wyo. 1992) (Big Horn III ) (describing Big Horn III as
“another appeal of an ongoing general adjudication of all water rights in the Big Horn River System,
involving over 20,000 claimants.”).
442

443
A comprehensive cost figure for the Big Horn adjudication unfortunately does not appear
to exist. As described by Judge Hartman in 2009 after he had retired from the bench: “While no
entity has determined the total cost of this project, suffice it to say that it was hundreds of millions
of dollars in time, effort and expense.” Gary P. Hartman, The Big Horn River General Stream
Adjudication, Wyo. Lawyer, Oct. 2009, at 1, 2. A similar ballpark figure uncovered in my research
comes from a book published by Geoff O’Gara in 2000 that placed the adjudication’s overall cost
at “more than $60 million so far.” O’Gara, supra note 14, at 174. Writing in 1993, nearly a decade
after he had stepped down as Special Master, Teno Roncalio published a book chapter indicating
the following as of that year: “To include the costs of attorneys of the Departments of Justice and
the Interior, of the tribes, and of many private parties, plus attorneys and consultants added to
the state payroll at work in the case, would surely run the total costs of the litigation to well over
$20 million.” Roncalio, supra note 272, at 211. Of this total, the State of Wyoming had spent
nearly $9 million as of a then “recent count.” Id. Roncalio’s state-specific figure is lower than the
$14 million in attorneys’ fees reportedly expended by the State of Wyoming as of 1995. Dividing
the Waters II, supra note 138, at 304. Roncalio’s figure does comport, however, with a counterpart
provided by Wyoming Assistant Attorney General S. Jane Caton on February 5, 1990, identifying
the state’s total litigation costs as $8,586,860. Membrino, supra note 153, at 7. For older statespecific figures, see Caton, supra note 233, at 21 (identifying state’s total expenditures from January
1977 to December 1987 as $8,140,634, including $4,524,100 in consultant fees, $3,082,573 in
legal fees, and $533,961 in administration fees), and Cox, supra note 233, at 8 (identifying state’s
total expenditures as of October 9, 1984, as $7,260,000, including $4,300,000 in fees labeled
“engineering, etc.,” $2,500,000 in legal fees, and $460,000 in clerical and administrative fees).

The Poetic History of Colorado, http://www.poets.org/poetsorg/text/poetic-history-colorado
(last visited March 17, 2015).
444
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counterpart adjudications embarked on by other western states during the past
several decades—a topic ably addressed later in this issue.445 So, too, does the
adjudication provide much food for thought about the normative question of
whether general stream adjudications are optimal measures for reconciling
competing interests of federal, state, and tribal sovereigns over water resources.
Again, please read on for expert coverage of this subject.446 Overall, it is hoped
that the preceding account of the Big Horn adjudication provides citizens,
policymakers, practitioners, and scholars alike with a worthwhile case study in
the use of general stream adjudications as management tools for the most precious
natural resource within the American West.
Yet the Big Horn adjudication is not solely relevant as an institutional
reference point. It is also a microcosm for paradigmatic themes western historians
have emphasized for many years to make sense of what has transpired within
the American West since the Louisiana Purchase in 1803 and before. One such
theme concerns vision and its role in shaping interactions among human beings
concerning natural resource use.447 As a species, we are unique in our capacity to
bring, or at least to attempt to bring, into reality diverse and potentially competing
visions of our collective and individual lives—visions that in myriad episodes of
western history have involved using natural resources for wide-ranging ends.448
The law has been implicated in this process in numerous ways—more precisely,
the concept of “property” as superimposed on natural resources.449 Water law
illustrates this pattern vividly. Its allocational and procedural rules have controlled
in no uncertain terms which communities and individuals have been entitled to
use, or have been prohibited from using, a resource that has been instrumental to
countless goals and aspirations that have been envisioned. Viewed from this angle,
the Big Horn adjudication is not purely remarkable as a case study for general
stream adjudications—their institutional design, utility, etc.—but also as a
testament to a phenomenon that has animated western history—namely, the role
445
See John E. Thorson, Reflections on Western General Stream Adjudications Upon the Signing of
Wyoming’s Big Horn River Adjudication Final Decree, 15 Wyo. L. Rev. 383 (2015). See also Ramsey
L. Kropf & S. Chapin Lewis, The Big Horn General Stream Adjudication Concludes After 37 Years,
1 W. Water L. & Pol’y Rep. 66 (2015) (discussing how Big Horn adjudication’s “organization
structure provides some useful lessons learned for ongoing adjudications” in other western states).
446
See Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Rethinking the Use of General Stream Adjudications, 15 Wyo.
L. Rev. 347 (2015) See also Dividing the Waters II, supra note 138, at 479–80 (describing perception
among Montana compact commission members and staff that Big Horn’s litigation-based approach
to adjudication of Indian reserved rights “made neighboring water users into lifelong enemies and
split the community between Anglo water users and Native American water users.”).

See, e.g., Elliott West, The Contested Plains: Indians, Goldseekers, and the Rush to
Colorado xxiv, 318, 333, 336 (1998).
447

448

Id. at xx.

See, e.g., Limerick, supra note 32, at 26 –27 (“Western history has been an ongoing
competition for legitimacy—for the right to claim for oneself and sometimes for one’s group the
status of legitimate beneficiary of Western resources. This intersection of ethnic diversity with
property allocation unifies Western history.”).
449
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played by law in mediating competing visions of communities and individuals
concerning their interactions with one another over the western landscape. In
whose hands did the adjudication place a pen from which life could be written in
the Wind-Big Horn Basin?
With these big-picture lenses on the Big Horn adjudication as background,
a final return is fitting to the roughly sixteen-month trial before Special Master
Roncalio that began in January 1981 and concluded in May 1982. As flagged
at the outset of this piece, Wyoming Attorney General John Troughton made
a clever quip on the first day of this trial regarding the “hot seat” in which the
special master sat. Not to be outdone, counsel for the State of Wyoming on
the last day of trial, Michael White, spoke with similar eloquence immediately
before the special master adjourned the session. Mr. White echoed what Attorney
General Troughton had said the year before. “I know that the United States and
the Tribes have told you that promises have been made to the Indians which you
need to insure are kept. We’ve told you that promises have been made to the nonIndians which you need to insure are kept.”450 “You are both correct,” replied the
special master.451 Mr. White then went on to quote a passage from Robert Frost’s
Stopping by Woods on a Snowy Evening—a passage Mr. White described as having
“haunted” him “during this entire trial over promises.”452 The passage reads: “The
woods are lovely, dark and deep, but I have promises to keep, and miles to go
before I sleep, and miles to go before I sleep.”453 “I suspect that’s the position in
which you find yourself,” described Mr. White. In so many words, the special
master agreed.454 He did have miles to go before producing his 467-page report by
the end of the year.455 The parties, too—though unaware of it at the time—also
had miles to go before the district court would conclude the adjudication more
than three decades later. And to further co-opt Robert Frost to bring this article
to its conclusion: Is it now time for sleep? With the Big Horn adjudication having
run its course, is it now time for sleep?
The questions just posed are rhetorical, and “no” is the unequivocal answer in
my view. Casting eyes toward the path that lies ahead, the patchwork pattern of water
rights decreed in the adjudication—reserved rights, Walton rights, appropriative
rights, and in some instances all of the above along the same ditch—mirrors in its
complexity the patchwork pattern of land ownership within the Wind-Big Horn
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Trial Transcript, supra note 1, at 215.

451

Id.
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Id.

Poetry Foundation, Stopping by Woods on a Snowy Evening by Robert Frost, http://www.
poetryfoundation.org/poem/171621 (last visited March 17, 2015).
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Trial Transcript, supra note 1, at 215.
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Roncalio Report, supra note 153.

312

Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 15

Basin.456 A clear understanding of the former pattern as it impacts the interests
of parties subject to the relevant decrees and orders is essential to their legal and
political empowerment. Sharing of this knowledge is nothing short of critical.
Such knowledge is also integral to another priority about which the adjudication,
particularly the Phase I litigation, speaks volumes: collaboration. The decrees and
orders provide a default framework that in the future will govern and coordinate
the activities of water rights holders as well as serve as a baseline from which these
parties may develop allocation and management arrangements that are innovative
and mutually beneficial.457 In the words of Special Master Roncalio a decade after
he resigned his post: “Creative solutions to common problems will be found. The
potential is limitless, needing only—as has always been the case in the West—the
people to match the challenges: ‘a society to match the scenery,’ as Wallace Stegner
expressed it.”458 Knowledge sharing and collaboration are two of numerous items
that might be referenced to speak to the same closing point in the Big Horn
adjudication’s wake. Perhaps there may come a time for “sleep” in Robert Frost’s
parlance, but, if so, it is miles away from here and now.

456
Big Horn Adjudication Manager Nancy McCann has painted this picture eloquently:
“[I]magine the checkerboard (or patchwork) ownership pattern overlaid with a patchwork of varying
water rights with different attributes of appurtenance (or not), abandonment (or not), water duties
and appropriations, varying administrations and priorities all on the same ditch.” Email from Nancy
McCann, Adjudication Manager, Wyoming State Board of Control (November 25, 2014) (on file
with author). Ms. McCann’s explanation of the historical and institutional processes underlying this
state of affairs is equally illuminating: “When the courts issued their orders, decrees, and decisions,
they looked through a legal microscope at the issue at hand, but did not see in a comprehensive way
the telescoping effects (big picture) when you have to sew all the resultant decrees together to see
how the pieces actually fit.” Id. The end product, in Ms. McCann’s words, “is more than just a quilt,
it is multi-layered and interwoven, separate but continuous with each thread.” Id.
457
See, e.g., Kropf & Lewis, supra note 445, at 66 (describing upon adjudication’s conclusion
how “many Wyoming participants expressed the desire for state, tribal and federal water users to
move forward with post-adjudication data-sharing and cooperative monitoring schemes to share
and administer this precious resource.”).
458
Roncalio, supra note 272, at 214. The excerpt in which the phrase attributed to Wallace
Stegner appears is itself apropos in this context. It describes the American West in terms that go
to the region’s heart—and, in this author’s view, to the heart of the Wind-Big Horn Basin’s future
and potential: “This is the native home of hope. When it fully learns that cooperation, not rugged
individualism, is the quality that most characterizes and preserves it, then it will have achieved itself
and outlived its origins. Then it has a chance to create a society to match its scenery.” Wallace
Stegner, The Sound of Mountain Water: The Changing American West 38 (1980).

